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ANNEX  1:  INFORMATION  ON  PRICING  PRACTICES  FOR  ELECTRICITY  AND  GAS  IN  THE 
MEMBER  STATES. 
ANNEX  2:  STATISTICAL  ANNEX. 1 
THE  APPLICJ\TIO:l  OF  THE  CO~UTY'S  mmRGY  PRICING  PRil1CIPLES 
IN liElffiER  STATES 
I  - INTRODUCTION 
1.  In  its  last  Communication  to  the  Council  on  energy  pricing1,  the 
Commission  said  that it would  examine  pricing practices  in Member  States 
to  assess their compatibility with  the principles adopted  by  the Council. 
2.  The  Commission  has  already  discussed  certain  aspects  Bf  energy 
pricing in its recent examination of national energy  programmes  • 
3.  The  present 1/Jorking  Document  includes  an  analysis of information pro-
vided  by  Governments  in  response  to  two  enquiries  carried  out  by  the 
Commission's  services during  1983.  These  enquiries  concerned  the applic-
ation  in  practice  both  of  the  general  pricing  principles  adopted  bs the 
Council  and  of the electricity tariff recommendation  adopted  in  1981  • 
4.  The  five objectives of the present report are: 
to  define,  fran nnnlyois or tho agreed pricing principles,  how  they 
should  be  applied  to  specific  situations  and  practices 
(Section II); 
to .summarise  the partial  information  on pricing practices in Mecher 
States which is available to the  Commission  services at this stage; 
(Section III) 
to  explain  the  deficiencies  which  exist  in  the  degree  of  price 
trnnoparency  and  recommend  how  these  should  be  remedied 
(Section  IV); 
to  emphasise  the  relevance  of  energy  pricing  policy  for  intrn-
Comcunity trade in the  energy field  (Section V); 
to  underline  the  role  or  taxation  in  energy  pricing  policy 
(Section VI). 
r-----------------------
coM(82)  651  of 19  October  1982. 
2  COM(84)  88 of  29  February  1984. 
3  Council  Recommendation  of  27  October  1981  on  electricity  tariff 
structures in the  Community  (81/924/CEE);  OJ  N°  L  337 of 24.11.1981. 2 
II  - ANALYSIS  OF  COMMUNITY  ENERGY  PRICING  PRINCIPLES 
A.  RE-STATEMENT  OF  PRICING  PRINCIPLES 
5.  The  principle  of  reuliotic  energy  pr~c1.ng has  been  endorsed  by  the 
Council  on  several  occasions  during  the  past years.  The  main  Council 
statements are set out below: 
II  consumer prices should reflect representative conditions on  the 
world  market,  taking account of longer-term trends; 
- one  of  the  factors  determining  consumer  prices  sHould  be  the 
cost of replacing and  developing  energy  resources; 
11  - consumer  prices  must  permit  an  adequate  level  of  investment  in 
II 
II 
energy  supply  and  encourage  energy  efficiency;  to  this  end, 
they  must  not  be  kept  at  artificially  low  levels  and  thereby 
prevented  from  providing reliable market  signals; 
- government  policies which  contribute to the  formation  of energy 
prices must  take  account of the need  for  a  realistic reflection 
of market  trends.  Differences  in pre-tax energy prices within 
the Community  may  arise from  the  existence of a  genuine  compet-
itive advantage  (arising for  example  from  favourable  location, 
prudent  investment,  superior  productivity  or  specific  market 
conditions),  or alternatively,  from  the existence of priorities 
consistent with  the  Community's  own  energy  objectives,  in part-
icular the objective of reduced  dependence  on  oil.  Any  differ-
ences  which  do  not  correspond  to  these  guidelines  must  be 
clearly  identified  and,  to  the  extent  that  they  ~ise  from 
differences in public policy,  progressively reduced;" 
-the Council  recommends  that the  Member  States  •••  apply  energy 
pricing policies  which  unite  the  pursuit  of  energy  objectives 
with  efforts  to  ensure 6that  prices  truly  correspond  to  market 
conditions  and  costs." 
Transparency  is  a  necessary  and urgent  condition for  the  imple-
mentation  of  the  principles .••  This  means  that  consumers  should 
have  adequate  access  to  information  on  energy prices and  gn  the 
methods  by  which both prices  and  tariffs are  determined." 
6.  These  pricing principles are  fully consistent with  the  Community's  EC 
competition policy.  They  also correspond,  as  far  as  coal  is concerned, 
to the general  provisions of the  ECSC  Treaty  (Article 3c). 
7.  The  principles set out in paragraph  5  are,  however,  all statements of 
general npplicntion,  i.e.  they  were  designed  to  cover all energy sectors 
and  all  types of market  situation.  In  applying  these  agreements  to spec-
ific cases,  it is necessary  to have  clearly  in  mind  the  fundamental  prin-
------------------------
4  Council  Resolution of 9  June  1980.  OJ  N°  C 149 of 18.6.1980  (annex). 
5  Council  Conclusions of 3  December  1981. 
6 
Council  Recommendation  of 28  July  1982;  OJ  N°  L  247 of 23.8.1982. 3 
ciples which  underlie the  Council  statements.  The  following  paragraphs 
refer entirely to  ex-tax consumer  prices.  The  role  of taxation  is dis-
cussed separately in Section VI  of this report. 
B.  RELATIONSHIP  WITH  ENERGY  POLICY 
B.  It is  first of all clear  from  the  Council  statements in  paragraph  5 
above  that realistic energy pricing is regarded  by all Member  States as  a 
ltey  elc:oent of energy  policy.  This  is  explicit or  implicit in  all the 
five  statements set out above.  Correct pricing will  clearly: 
further  energy  efficiency  and  coneervntion  by  ensuring  that  con-
sumers'  decisions  are  based  on  prices  which  take  full  account  of 
the costs of energy supply; 
lead to effective decisions  on  fUel  choice,  again  by  ensuring that 
consumers  take  account  of  real  costs  in  their  investment  and  pur-
chasing decisions: 
similarly,  help  to  ensure  optimal  allocation  of  each  particular 
fuel  according to its value  in each  type  of use; 
promote  nccuri  ty  of  energy  nupply  by  assuring  the  necessary  rev-
enues  to  underwrite  investments  in  production  or  long-term  supply 
contracts. 
9.  It is  also  a  clear  corollary  of  the  Council  statements  that  energy 
pricing  nhould  be  bnned  on  energy  and  competition  objectives  nnd  not 
(tihere  there  is  n  conflict)  on  objectives  in other  arena of economic or 
oocinl policy.  This is not,  of course,  to say that other  important ob-
jectives in fields  such  as  social,  industrial,  trade or transport policy 
should be  set aside,  but rather  that they  should not  be  pursued  through 
introducing distortions  in the energy  market.  Otherwise,  it would not be 
possible to operate  an  effective energy  pricing policy.  Indeed,  the  lack 
of such efficient pricing would  hinder the  Community's  industrial  compet-
itiveness  on  the world  market. 
C.  OVERALL  FINANCIAL  VIABILITY 
10.  The  statements  set  out  in  paragraph  5  above  refer  extensively  to 
cost considerations.  In  all  energy  sectors  a  basic  reference  point  for 
pricing  must  be  that  rcvenucn  nhould  nt  lennt  cover  costa.  Only  if 
revenues are sufficient to cover costs,  including capital charges,  oper-
ating costs and  an  adequate rate of return on capital,  will  the supply-
ing  company  normally  be  able  to  continue  in  business.  There  are,  how-
ever,  a  number  of  cases  in  Member  States'  energy markets  where  revenues 
do  not cover costs.  In such  instances,  the relevant companies  are kept  in 
existence  through  government  support or  some  form  of market  protection. 
11.  The  main  factor  in  determining revenues  will of  course  be  the  over-
all level o:r pricee,  within which  the prices  to particular consumers will 
be  differentiated according to supply  conditions,  etc.  Energy  companies 
may  earn  revenues  from  activities  other  than  supplying  energy  to  con-
sumers,  but these  activities should,  in  economic  terms,  be  treated as 4 
separate businesses,  each required to earn its own  return.  In all sec-
tors of business,  it is naturally important that energy  suppliers should 
operate efficiently so as  to keep  costs  down. 
12.  Financial viability,  as  a  reflection of overall price levels,  should 
therefore  be  one  of the  guiding principles  for realistic  energy pricing. 
The  continuation  of  a  financial  deficit  oi  tuation  for  more  than  a  tem-
porary period is clearly undesirable  in  any  energy sector. 
13.  It has  on  occasion  been  suggested that a  level  of pricing which  did 
not  provide  enough  revenue  to  cover  costs  would  be  desirable  on  energy 
policy grounds.  The  purpose  would  be  to bias  conoumer  choice  towards  that 
particular  fuel  oo  as  to  dioplaco  in  the  short  term  a  fuel  (such  as 
imported  oil)  which  was  viewed  as  less  desirable.  In  the  view  of  the 
Commission  services'o view,  this is not  a  sound  argument.  The  best way 
to  achieve  such  an  objective  would  be  to  imp one  11  tax  on  the  fuel 
regarded as  less secure.  The  al  ternati  vc  of  reducing  the  price  of  the 
more  desirable  fuel  belo-...,  cost  could  create  a  need  to  subsidise  the 
industry  which  supplied  it.  It would  also  encourage  consumption  \'lhich 
would  not  have  been  economic  if  consumers  were  paying  the  fuel's  true 
cost. 
14.  Within  the overall principle of financial viability,  however,  there 
may  be  temporary  periods  in  which  financial  losses  have  to  be  incurred. 
This  can  happen,  for  instance,  in the very  early years of establishing a 
new  supply  network,  for  example  during  the  introduction  of natural  gas 
into  a  country or  region.  In  such  periodn,  there  will  be  high capital 
investment  and  a  shortage  of premium  outlets until  the  supply  network  in 
adequately  developed.  Even  where  these  special  circumstances  do  not 
apply  there  can  be  short-term  situations  in  which  losses  are  made, 
usually  because  sales  have  been  lower  than  expected  and  planned  for, 
eg:  during an  economic  recession. 
15.  Such situations will always  have  to be  judged  case  by  case  on  objec-
tive criteria.  The  key  considerations will  be  whether  there have  indeed 
been  special  circumstances  or  unexpected  changes  in  market  conditions 
which  have  led  to  the  loss-making  situation,  and  whether  the  government 
or company  concerned has  developed  a  plan to  ensure  a  return to financial 
viability,  including recuperation of accumulated deficits.  In  general, 
where  there is already  an  establinhed supply  oystem,  the persistence of a 
!inancial deficit situation for more  than  two  years  should  be  regarded  as 
a  cause  for  concern. 
16.  It  is  also  generally  accepted  that  prices  should  reflect  lon~ run 
coats.  Since  each unit o! energy  consumed  will  need  to  be  replaced even-
tually by  new  supplies,  the  argument is that consumers  should  pay prices 
now  which  reflect that  economic  cost  and  therefore  discourage  wasteful 
usc.  This  argument  is generally  advanced  in  situations where  costs are 
likely to increase over  time,  which  may  not always  be  the case.  Whatever 
view  is  taken  of  future  costs  hovtever,  the  principle  of  financial via-
bility should clearly still apply. 5 
D.  COSTS  AND  MARKET  CONDITIONS 
17.  To  achieve  the  objective  that  overall  revenues  should  cover  costs, 
including long-term costs, it evidently follows  that priceo to individual 
cono~ern should  at least cover costs.  As  between different  consumers, 
there  will  however  be  significant  cost  differences.  A  large  consumer 
will,  because  of economies of scale,  give rise to  lower capital costs per 
unit of  energy  supplied  than  a  small  consumer.  Similarly,  unit costs 
will  be  lower where  there is  a  fairly  steady rate  of offtake rather than 
large  daily  or seasonal  variations.  The  Community's  pricing principles 
recognise  that  these  cost  differences  should  be  reflected  in  prices  to 
individual  consumers. 
18.  The  pricing principles also refer,  however,  to rnnrlcet  f'nctorc.  In 
market  terms,  leaving  aside  any  government  price  controls,  the  price 
which  can  be  charged for supplying a  particular fuel  to a  particular type 
of consumer will be  limited  by: 
a)  competition  from  other suppliers of the same  fuel; 
b)  competition  from  alternative fuels. 
19.  Where  the  first  type  of  competition  exists  then  price  levels  will 
tend  to  approach  costs  plus  a  reasonable  profit  margin.  Attempts  to 
charge higher  prices will  be  undercut  by  competitors  in  the  same  sector. 
Temporary  situations  may  even  arise  in  \'Ihich  the  level  of  competition 
forces  revenues  down  below  costs,  as  in  the  oil  refining  sector  in  the 
past few  years.  But  this  type  of situation will  eventually  be  resolved 
by  some  companies  going out of business  or reducing capacity.  Similarly, 
competition  from  other  fuels  which  cannot  be  met  without  cutting  prices 
below costs  will  inevitably  lead  to  eventual  withdrawal  from  that  sector 
of the market.  In  a  sector  where  there  is effective  market  competition 
with other suppliers of the  same  fuel,  therefore,  prices will  tend  to  be 
cost-related. 
20.  But  where  there  is  no  competition  from  other  suppliers  of  the  same 
fuel,  ie:  in a  sectoral nonopoly  situation,  cost-related pricing will not 
be  the  automatic  outcome.  In  these circumstances,  the  logical  co~~crcinl 
reaction of  the  monopoly  concerned  would  be  to  maximise  its  price  levels 
up  to  a  ceiling set only  by  competition  from  alternative fuels. 
21.  This  is  of  course  the  classic  question  of  cconoroic  rent,  ie:  the 
difference between  the  cost  of  the  fue  1  concerned  and  its  cmrket  value, 
or  in  other  words  the  maximum  price  which  can  be  charged  for  it without 
consumers  switching  to  another  fuel.  In  the  competitive  situation  dis-
cussed  in  paragraph  19  a  major  share  of  that  rent  would  be  captured  by 
the consumer.  In  a  monopoly  situation it could virtually all be  captured 
by  the supplier. 
22.  In  a  monopoly  situation  there  will  naturally  be  a  certain  tendency 
towards  public authorities'  intervention  in pricing,  for  reasons  of both 
energy  policy  and  consumer  protection.  In  many  such cases,  the  monopoly 
utilities concerned will  in fact be  State enterprises.  In  market  sectors 
where  there  is  a  positive  margin  between  supply costs,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  market value  as  determined  by  competition  from  alternative fuels,  on 
the  other,  governments  will  have  the  flexibility  to  determine  where 
prices should be set within that range.  They  may,  of course,  choose  not 
to  intervene,  which  would  normally  have  the  effect of prices  rising to 6 
the level  of competing  fuels.  But  in  any  case  it will  be  important  to 
ensure  that  there  is no  discrimination  between  consumers,  (particularly 
those  in  comparable  situations)  that  there  is  price  transparency,  and 
that energy  policy  aims  are  taken  into  account. 
23.  There  will  of  course  also  be  situations  where  the  competition  from 
alternative fuels  is  so  strong  that  market  value  is  below  supply  costs. 
In  those  circumstances,  it is clear that  the basic principle of at least 
covering costs  should  be  maintained,  ie:  that  monopoly  suppliers  should 
not  continue  to  supply  such  markets.  It is  important  to  stress  this 
point  because  a  pricing  practice  which  can  arise  in  sectoral  monopoly 
situations  is  that  of  cronn-ouboidisation.  By  charging  some  consumers 
prices which  exceeded costs  a  monopoly  supplier could  of course  generate 
surplus revenues.  Without sacrificing overall  financial  viability,  he 
could  then  afford  to  charge  other  consumers  prices  which  did  not  cover 
costs,  so  as  to  fend  off competition from  other fuels  or,  in  some  cases, 
to further  governments'  social  or industrial  policy  aims.  This  type  of 
pricing practice would  tend  to distort energy  costs  to  consumers  and  lead 
to  misallocations of resources. 
24.  In  summary,  cost-related and  market-related pricing wil]  amount  to 
the  same  thing  where  there  is  competition  within  a  particular  energy 
sector.  In  a  monopoly  situation,  however,  there  is  a  more  difficult 
choice  to  be  made  between  these  two  options  which  will  depend  on  part-
icular  circumstances  and  on  energy  pol icy  aims.  But  even  where  an 
element  of  market-related  pricing  exists,  the  minimum  principle  that 
prices charged  to  individual  consumers  should  at least  cover costs  still 
applies. 
E.  THE  ENERGY  SECTORS 
25.  The  analysis of pricing practices must  of course  take  account of the 
fact  that  market  structure  and  costs  vary  substantially  between  the 
different  Community  energy  sectors.  The  evaluation  which  follows 
nuegento  that  at thio  otnge  the  priority  areao  :for  npplication  of  the 
Cor.~ity'n pricing principleo should be  the gnn  and electricity sectors. 
But  problems  certainly  exist  also  in  the  oil  and  coal  sectors,  which 
require  further  study.  Individual  companies  nnd  governments  have  drawn 
the  consequences  and  are restructuring the  refining sector. 
1.  Oil 
26.  In  the oil products cnrket,  the basic  level of costs is set by  crude 
oil  prices  (largely  determined  by  OPEC)  plus  freight,  refining  and 
distribution costs.  In  most  Member  States,  an  effective level of down-
stream competition  exists,  so  that  the  overall  level  of prices  will  in 
general reflect costs plus  a  modest profit margin.  In recent years,  the 
margin  over  crude  oil  costs  has  even  been  negative  for  considerable 
periods. 
27.  Within  overall price  levels,  the structure of prices  for  individual 
oil  products  is  determined  by  inter-fuel  as  well  as  intra-fuel  competi-
tion,  ie:  higher  unit  proceeds  will  be  earned  from  products  (eg: 
gasoline)  where  there  is  no  substantial  competition  from  alternative 
fuels.  The  question  of  cross  subsidisation  does  not  arise,  however, 7 
because  costs  cannot  be  assigned  to  individual  products  jointly  produced 
with  others  in  the  refinery.  Also  the  scope  for  adjusting  individual 
product yields  iD  limited in the short term  and  refining companies  do  not 
therefore  hav~  the  option  of substantially  cutting down  their Bales  of  a 
particular  product  which  earns  a  lower  return.  Over  the  lonr;er  term, 
however,  greater  changes  in  the  yield  pattern  can  be  (and  often  are) 
achieved  through  investments  in new  conversion  plant. 
28.  The  key  to  realistic  pricing  in  dovmstrcnm  oil  products  markets, 
therefore,  is  a  climate  of  genuine  competition  between  oil  suppliers. 
There  are  clearly  differences  in  the  level  of  competition  operating  in 
particular Member  States.  Another  source of difference  is the  existence 
of price  control  regimes  in  a  number  of  countries.  These  too differ in 
intensity and  criteria of  application.  It is  of course  fully justified 
that  governments  should  have  price  control  pO':Jero  for  use  in  oil  emer-
gency  situations,  but  in  normal  market  conditions .there  is  a  risk that 
continuation  of  price  controls  may  introduce  market  distortions  and 
damage  the  industry's performance. 
29.  The  most  appropriate principles for  governments  to follow  in  the oil 
products market therefore would  seem  to be: 
i)  cncurine that competition bebreen  oil suppliers  is maintained at a 
satisfactory level; 
ii  )  nvoidnnce  of  price  control  mcanures  of  a  ldnd  which  prevent 
suppliers  earning  sufficient  revenues  to  cover  current  coots  nnd 
f'inance  inventccnt  needs.  The  latter  are  likely  to  be  high  in 
coming  years  because  of  the  changing  pattern  of  demand  and  new 
environmental  legislation. 
30.  The  Commission  services  are  reviewing  the  oil  product  markets  and 
price control  regimes  in  the  Member  States.  This  review  will  compare 
consumer  prices  before  tax  over recent  years  for  comparable  sales  of the 
same  petroleum  product  in  different  Member  States  and  will  estimate  the 
extent  to  \llhich  price  differences  are  due  to  differences  in  costs  and 
what  port  is played  hy  official  price  control  systems.  The  effects  of 
the latter will  be  assessed under  both crisis and  normal  conditions.  In 
the  light  of  this  work,  the  Commission  services  will  consider  any 
necessary  recommendations  on  steps  required  to  improve  the  operation of 
the markets  concerned. 
2.  Coal 
31.  Community  coal  production costs are,  in general,  higher  than  import 
prices of third country coal.  In  some  Member  States there  is a  degree  of 
protection,  allowing  Community  coal  to  be  sold  at  prices  covering  pro-
duction costs.  But  in general prices are aligned,  under Article 60(2b) 
of the  ECSC  Treaty,  on  the price of imported  coal  which  is at present  the 
main  competitor.  In  view  of  the  resulting  losses,  the  Community  coal 
industry  is  receiving  State  aids  under  two  Community  systems  which  have 
had  to  be  developed  since  1965. 
3~.  The  Community  aid  system  in  favour  of  coke  and  coking  coal  for  the 
steel  industry,  which  is  designed  to  maintain  production  for  security 
reasons,  has  been  prolonged  for  a  further  3  year period until the  end  of 
1986  (Commission  Decision  759/84/ECSC). 8 
33.  As  far  as  steam  co:tl  is  concerned,  the  Community  coal  industry is 
receiving  subsidies  frorn  national  governments  under  the  general  system 
concernine financial  aid  (Commission Decision  528/76/ECSC).  This  system 
was  initially  introduced  in  1965  to  facilitate  an  orderly  reduction  in 
Community  coal  output.  In  1976,  the policy was  amended  to maintain coal 
production on  supply security  grounds.  Social  and  regional policy  con-
siderations  continue  to  play  an  important  role.  As  the  1976  decision 
will expire  at the  end of next year,  it will  be  necessary  to  review the 
arguments  underlying this  aid  system.  This  analysis is being undertaken 
and  a  proposal will be  sent to the  Council. 
3.  Electricity 
34.  The  electricity sector is capital  intensive.  In  addition,  the  tech-
nical characteristics of the  transmission  and  diRtribution aspects of the 
sector  have  led  to  the  responoibility  for  these  activities  being 
entrusted  to  national or  regional  monopolies;  these utilities  are  often 
the  only  producers  as  well.  Notwithstanding  these  structural  arrange-
ments,  electricity  utilities are  subject  to  some  forms  of  competition. 
One  form  is  own  production  by  large  industrial  users,  although  these 
activities are  often limited  in practice.  There  is also  competition  in 
the heating market  from  other  fuels. 
35.  In  October  1981,  the  Council  adopted  specific  electricity  tariff 
recommendations  including: 
"Electricity supply  undertakings  should  • . •  cover  their costs  on  the 
basis  of  the  most  objective  allocation  possible  of  such  costs  among 
the various categories of users. 
Electricity tariff structures should  reflect  the  costs  incurred 
in supplying the various  categories of consumer. 
Tariffs7based  on  the use  to which  electricity is put  should  be  elimi-
nated." 
36.  These  recommendations  clearly  embody  the  concept  o:f  financial  via-
bility  other  than  in  temporary  exceptional  circumstances  (paragraphs  10 
to  15 above)  and  the principle that prices to individual consucers should 
at least cover  cost  (paragraphs  17  to  24).  There  is  no  doubt  that the 
re:ferences  to  costs  in  the  :first  two  recommendations  embrace  long-term 
costs,  in  the  case  o:f  electricity largely  determined  by  investment  needs. 
37.  Applying  these  principles  requires  better  appreciation  o:f  de:fin-
itions and  methodology.  The  Commission  services  and  UNIPEDE,  are  com-
pleting two  studies: 
a  methodology  for  establishing  the  comparability  o:f  the  financial 
and  economic  situation o:f  di:f:ferent utilities,  and 
a  study  o:f  electricity pricing policies  and  transparency,  including 
consideration o:f  the relationship between  consumer prices  and  costs 
o:f  supply,  in  the  context  o:f  the  Council  Recommendation  on  elec-
tricity  tari:f:f structures. 
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4.  Natural  Gas 
38.  In  the  natural  gnn  mnrltet  also,  there  is  a  dominance  of  monopoly 
suppliers  at  regional  or  national  level.  Investment  needs  for  the gas 
industry are  important  but  a  more  crucial  factor  in  the  industry's  fin-
ances  is  the  price  paid  in  respect  of  long-term  gnn  purchnne contrnctn. 
Specific natural  gas price and tariff recommendations  were  adopted  by  the 
Council  in April  1983,  in particular that: 
"Natural  gas  prices for  consumers  should  be  as  close  as  possible 
to the  market value  of natural  gas  in  relation  to  the  price  of  sub-
stitute  forms  of  energy  and  guarantee  sufficient  proceeds  to  cover 
the cost of supply  to consumers.  · 
Methods  of forming natural gas prices  should  be  designed  to adjust to 
changes  in  the  competitive  situation  on  the  market  and  to  trends  in 
costs  and,  more  particularly,  the  cost  to  gas  undertakings  of 
acquiring gas. 
Prices  should not be artificially low  in relation to  the  market situ-
ation  and  to  costs,  thereby  • • •  subsidising certain  categories  of 
consumption  or certain uses and/or  •••  encouraging waste. 
Natural  gas  tariff systems  should  reflect  as  accurately  as  possible 
the  structure  of  the  sugply  and  distribution  costs  for  the  various 
categories of supplies." 
39.  The  concept  of  financial  vinbili  ty  is  explicit  in  the  first  and 
second  of  these  statements.  The  third  and  fourth  make  it  clear  that 
prices to individual  consur~ern nhould at lcnnt cover contn.  The  reference 
to  'market  value'  in  relation  to  substitutes  reflects  the  policy  option 
that,  where  market  value exceeds  supply costs  for  the  utility,  govern-
ments  may  choose  to  allow  prices  to  rise  to  those  of  the  alternative 
fuel,  which will usually be  an oil product.  As  discussed in paragraph  22 
above  this  choice  should  be  based  on  non-discrimination  between  con-
sumers,  particularly those  in comparable  situations,  and  take  account of 
energy  policy  considerations.  Governments  will  also  need  to  consider 
whether it is in  the public interest to generate surplus  revenues  through 
charging consumers higher market-related prices,  given that energy  price 
levels are probably already high  enough  to  encourage  energy  efficiency. 
40.  The  natural  gas  pricing principles also  recognise the  importance  of 
long-tcrc  cootn  in  referring  to  'the  cost  to  gas  undertakings  of 
acquiring gas'.  In  the  case of  EC  countries,  this cost is probably best 
represented  by  the price of imported  gas  from  available  supply  sources  in 
the  region  such  as  Norway,  the  USSR  and  Africa,  although  there  is,  in 
fact,  no  single  common  price for  these  sources.  In recent  years,  such 
prices  have  been  moving  towards  equivalence  with oil  products,  allowing 
for  distribution  costs,  but  that  tendency  may  change  as  a  result  of 
increased  competition between potential external gas  suppliers. 
41.  There  is  also  a  new  and  developing  tendency  in  the  EC  gas  market  in 
the  form  of  'spot'  sales  to  EC  utili  ties  at  advantageous  prices  by  ex-
ternal suppliers,  notably  the  USSR.  Such sales will of course  allow the 
8-~;;~;--~~~~~~~~~~~~~n  of  21  April  1983  on  the  methods  of  forming 
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selling  countries  to  max~m~se  the  use  of  pipeline  capacity  and  earn  a 
better  return  on  their  initial capital  investment.  In  the  EC  markets, 
these additional  quanti ties  of  gas  will  usually  be  supplied  by  the  util-
ities  to  large  consumers,  ouch  as  power  stations  and  major  industries, 
which  can  absorb  them  by  displacing other fuels,  eg:  in dual-fired instal-
lations.  It is,  of course,  important that such  transactions  between  the 
utility and  the final  consumer  should  be  cons intent  with  the  Communi ties  1 
pricing principles. 
42.  There  can  of  course  be  ::;hort-term  attractions  in  such  arrangements, 
both  in  terms  of  displacinr, oil  and  in  keeping  dovm  utility  and  consumer 
costs.  But  the longer-term implications of this  new  pattern of trade will 
need  to  be  closely  watched.  The  Commission  has  drawn  attention  in  its 
recent communications  on  natural  gas,  to  the  importance  of oupply diversi-
fication  as  far  an  natural  gas  imports  are  concerned,  and  this  view  has 
been  endorsed  by  the  Council.  The  evolution  of  such  trade  could  even-
tually  accentuate  the  level  of  dependence  on  particular  external 
suppliers,  which  could  in turn react both on  the overall  level  of security 
and  on  the  prices charged for such  'spot•  or marginal  sales. 
III - INFORMATION  ON  PRICING  PRACTICES 
A.  GENERAL 
43.  For  the reasons  explained  in Section II.E above,  this Section of the 
paper  concentrates  on  the  nnturnl  gas  and  eltlctricity  sectors.  The 
situation  in  the  oil  sector  will  be  considered  further  in  the  light  of 
the  Commission  services•  study  proposed  in  paragraph  30.  For coal,  the 
next step  will  be  a  forthcoming  study of  subsidy measures  under  the  ECSC 
Treaty. 
44.  Two  clear  principles  have  emerged  from  the  preceding  discussion 
which  apply  to  both  the gas  and  electricity sectors: 
i) :financial  vinbili  ty,  ie:  revenues  from  overall  prices  should  at 
least be  sufficient to cover costs,  including capital charges. 
ii) cost allocation,  ie:  prices charged  to individual  consumers  should 
at least cover supply costs. 
45.  The  following  summarizes  the  information  supplied  by  Member  States 
in reRpect  of these  two  principles.  (For details,  see  Annex  1). 
B.  OVERALL  FINANCIAL  VIABILITY 
46.  All  the  governments  have  endorsed  the  principle  that  the  gas  <md 
electricity industries  should set  prices at  a  level  which  not  only  covers 
their  total  costs,  but  also  ensures  a  satisfactory  return  en  capital 
assets. 
47.  In  about  half  the  Member  States,  however,  there  are  gas  or  elec-
tricity  companieo  - often  State  enterprises - \v!1ich  are  facin~  financial 
djfficulties because  of  inadequate  revenues.  There  nre of course  problems 
in  making  comparisons  because  of  variations  in  accounting  practices. 
Nevertheless,  it is possible to identify several d.ifferent  types  of case. 11 
48.  One  favourable  category is made  up  of those  companies  which,  with the 
tacit or active approval  of governments,  are  now  moving  towards  financial 
viability by  means  of price  increases.  In  some  cases,  this is firmly  in 
hand  and  in others negotiations  to that end  are  currently underway. 
49.  The  Co~mission services acknowledge  that these  instances where  action 
is  being  taken  to  restore  financial  viability  illustrate  the  growing 
importance  Member  States  are  giving  to  realistic  energy  pricing.  It is 
however  important  that  these  efforts  should  not  only  restore  financial 
viability,  but  also  lead  to  the  recovery  of  losses  accumulated  in  past 
years. 
50.  In  several other cases,  however,  utilities have  not yet  taken  action 
to  move  towards  viability  or  are  even  facing  a  deteriorating  financial 
situation.  A number  of different causes  can  be  identified: 
i)  adverse  economic  circumstances  such  as  the  impact  on  sales  of econ-
omic  recession,  increases  in  the cost  of fuel  purchases,  contract 
rigidities or dollar inflation; 
ii)  an  early stage of development,  for  instance  the construction for  the 
first time  of a  national gas  network.  Such  periods will  be  charac-
terised  by  high  investment  costs  and  a  lack  of  access  to  premium 
markets; 
iii) tarification  practices  which  may  result  in  a  financial  deficit 
situation  through  greater  emphasis  on  long-term rather  than current 
costs,  and  because  amortisation  of capital  assets is  based  on  his-
torical rather than replacement values; 
iv)  government policies requiring utilities to hold  down  price  levels  in 
order  to  take  account  of  other  social  or  counter-inflation  objec-
tives. 
51.  As  far  as  the  first  two  cases  are  concerned,  the  Co~~ission 
servicesare conscious  of ouch  difficulties  and  has  in  Section II.  C  above 
recognized  that  temporary  periods  of  financial  deficit  may  be  unavoid-
able.  Nevertheless,  it  remains  the  case  that  situations  in  111hich 
revenues  do  not  cover  costs  will  be  of  concern  not  only  to  the  Member 
State  interested  in  achieving  more  realistic  pricing  but  also  to  other 
Member  States  because  of  the  competitive  effects  for  their  own  energy 
consuming industries.  The  essential point is that the  governments  and/or 
utili  ties  concerned  should  prepare  and  implement  effective  plans  to 
restore  financial  viability  and  recover  accumulated  losses  as  soon  m: 
possible.  The  Council  may  wish  to  be  kept  informed  of such  plans  and  of 
their  progress  in  re~Jtoring  financial  viability  of  the  utility.  The 
Commission  would,  in cooperation with  the  Member  States concerned,  pre-
pare periodic reports on  developments. 
52.  As  regards  the  third  case,  the  Commission  services  will  pursue  this 
type  of problem  with  the utilities and/or governments  concerned,  with  the 
aim  of ensuring that obstacles  to financial  viability are  removed.  As  has 
been  mentioned  in  paragraph  35  above,  the  Commission  services  are  now 
examining  with  UNIPEDE  the  structure  and  economic  implications  of  elec-
tricity  tariffs,  including  the  question  of  amortination.  It will  also 
invite  the gas  industry to take part in  a  parallel exercise. 12 
53.  Finally,  the  type of  situation outlined  in  (iv)  above  is  clearly in 
conflict with  the  Community's  energy  pricing  principles,  as  approved  by 
the Council.  Policy objectives outside  the  energy field  can  and  should  be 
pursued  by  measures  which  do  not  hinder  energy· pricing  and  energy policy 
aims.  The  Commission  invites  the  Council  to  reaffirm  this view. 
C.  COST  ALLOCATION 
1.  Electricity 
54.  All  Member  States' 
cost-related in the  sense 
the  appropriate  supply 
approaches  are followed, 
long-term marginal  costs 
Governments  have  confirmed  that  tariffs  are 
that for  each  category  of consumer  they  reflect 
costs  as  closely  as  possible.  Different 
amongst  \>Thich  tariff setting in  accordance with 
is fairly widespread. 
55.  This  price differentiation is,  in the  majority  of cases,  implemented 
through  a  published  tariff  syotem  applying  to  all  categories  of  con-
Burners,  including large consumers,  and  based  on  general criteria such  as 
vol  tnge,  maximum  power  requirements,  and  the  level  and  profile of  con-
numption. 
56.  In  a  few  countries tariff structures are  now  being modified,  or have 
recently  been  modified,  so  as  either  to  correspond  better  to  new  elec-
tricity  production  structures  or  to  eliminate  preferential  rates  prev-
iously  granted  to  the  minimum  level  of  domestic  consumption.  In  the 
opinion of the  Commission  services,  these  changes  demonstrate  the  growing 
tendency  to  move  towards  more  renlh;ti.c  pricing.  Such  efforts  should 
continue  to  be  pursued  and  the  Member  States  are  invited  to  keep  the 
Commission  services  informed of developments  of this type. 
57.  There  are,  however,  still certain practices  which  raise  questions 
about  their compatibility  with  the  pricinG principles.  In  r.tember  coun-
tries  where  State  enterprises  are  responoible  for  clectrici ty  supply, 
non-encrp~ objectives,  for example  in the  social policy  field,  are still 
a  hindrance  to  realistic  cnereY  pr1c1ng.  The  Commission  therefore 
invites the  Council  to call  upon  all  Member  States  to  ensure  that  enereY 
objectives are  given priority  in enerrs pricinp,. 
58.  In  some  other cases,  particularly  those  where  genernlly-applicable 
published  tariffs do  not exist,  the  information  which  ha::::  been  received 
from  Governments  in  not  sufficient  to  allow  the  Commission  services  to 
assess  conformity  with  the  agreed  pricing principles.  But  some  cases 
certainly  exist  where  preferential  price  terms  are  made  available  to 
large industrial electricity consumers.  These  cases  need  to  be  examined 
in depth.  As  a  first step,  the  Commission  services propose  to carry out 
a  study of electricity pricing to  aluminium producers. 
2.  Natural  Gas 
59.  In  contrast  to  the  electricity  sector,  where  supply  costs  are  the 
dominant  factor  in  setting prices  for particular  types of  consumer,  the 
situation  in  the  gas  industry  is  much  more  heterogenous.  In  general, 13 
prices  take  account  both  of  supply  costs  and  of  competition  with  other 
fuels.  The  relative importance of these  two  criteria varies considerably 
amongst  Member  States. 
60.  In  addition,  Governments  have  notified  the  Commission  of  certain 
cases where  the  price of gas  to domestic  consumers  has  been held  down  for 
social  reasons.  These  cases  are  clearly  in  conflict  with  the  agreed 
pr1.c1.ng  principles.  As  for  electricity,  the  Commission  invites  the 
Council  to  lend  support  in eliminating such practices. 
61.  There  are  also  specific  pricing  problems  in  major  sectors  of  gas 
consumption,  such  as  power stations and  the petro-chemical  industry. 
62.  A  particular  question  of  natural  gas  pricing  arises  in  the  po1r1er 
station  sector.  Council  Directive  404  of  1975  requires  the  use  of 
natural  gas  in  power  stations  to  be  authorized  by  Member  State  govern-
ments  only  under  specified  conditions.  Annex  1  lists a  number  of cases 
where  natural  gas  is  at  present  being  consumed  in  power  stations  under 
these  exemption  provisions.  It is not within  the remit  of this  Commun-
ication to  discuss  the  application of  Directive 404,  other than  to note 
that it remains  in force.  But  the  question of the pricen at which gas  is 
supplied in such  cases is,  of course,  relevant. 
63.  The  general  principles  developed  in  Section II  should,  in  the  view 
of the  Commission  services,  apply  in respect of this gas  usage.  Details 
of  current  practices  are  set  out  in  Annex  1  and  these  illustrate  the 
range  of  prices charged.  The  Commission  invites  Member  States  to adapt 
these practices to the general  pricing principles. 
64.  The  pricing of gas  to  the Petrochemical ncctor and  more  specifically 
for  the  manufacture  of  ammonia  is  being  reviewed  by  the  Commission  ser-
vices.  The  Commission  has  completed  its  analysis  in  respect  of  such 
pr1.c1.ng  in  the  Netherlands,  and  its  services  will  be  reviewing  current 
practices with national authorities in several other Member  States. 
65.  The  Netherlands  case  concerned  a  two-tier pricing system  for natural 
gas used  in fertilizer production,  related to whether  or not the product 
was  being  exported outside  Europe.  Following a  series of  complaints  by 
other Member  States  and  industrial enterprises,  the  Commission  informed 
the  Dutch  Government  earlier  this  year  that  it  had  opened  a  procedure 
under Article  93(2)  EEC  in respect of this pricing system. 
66.  In  the  course of  this  procedure,  the  Dutch  Government  informed  the 
Commission  that Gasunie  had  abolished  the  two-tier  price system  and  had 
introduced,  from  November  1983,  a  generally applicable tariff in respect 
of very  large industrial  users  located  in the  Netherlands.  3  This tariff 
is based  on  annual  gas  consumption of at least 600  million m  ,  an  offtake 
load  factor  of  at  least  90%,  interruptibili  ty  at  the  supplier's  sole 
discretion  and at short notice,  and  acceptance of gas  of differing calor-
ific values. 
67.  After  careful  examination  of  technical  and  cost  factors,  the 
Commission  concluded  that this new  tariff,  which  is part of the general 
structure of  the Dutch  gas tariff  system  and  is not  sectorally discrimi-
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natory,  did not contain elements of State aid  and,  furthermore,  was  in 
conformity  with  energy  pricing  principles.  The  Commission  therefore 
decided  to close  the  pro~cdure under Article 93(2). 
68.  In November  1983,  the  Commission  wrote  to other Member  States ask-
ing  for  information  on  current  pricing  practices  for  feedstock  gas 
supplied to the fertilizer sector.  A summary  of the replies is contained 
in  Annex  1.  The  Commission  services are  examining these  data  in consul-
tation with the respective Member  States. 
IV  - TRANSPARENCY 
69.  Ministers  have  confirmed  that  maximum  possible  transparency  is  an 
important  element  in  achieving  a  sound  energy  pr1c1ng  policy.  The 
Commission  hns  striven  in  recent  years  to  improve  the  transparency  of 
energy  PfJces  in  the  different  sectors,  principally  through  the  Pricing 
Bulletin  which  has  provided,  in  a  structured manner,  pricing information 
for various  types of consumer  in the different Member  States.  While  this 
has  been partially successful,  there is still considerable progress  to be 
made,  particularly in key  sectors related to  large users. 
70.  In  practice,  better  transparency  cnn  be  achieved  both  by  improved 
statistical  information  and  by  a  more  standardized  means  of  setting 
tariffs charged for different  quantitie~ of fuel  purchased.  On  the first 
point,  however,  there are  difficult:.-s  i.n  getting better transparency  in 
the  upper  range  of  consumer  use,  arising  from  commercial  considerations 
regarding  secrecy  surrounding  the  contracts.  This  is an  important issue 
in  achieving  better  transparency  and  the  experience  in  different  Member 
States indicates 'the potential for  improvement. 
71.  The  argument is  made  by  some  Member  States that  greater  transparency 
inhibits the  commercial  behaviour  and  thus  the profitability of particular 
enterprises.  Yet  in other Member  States  there is a  wider range  of transp-
arency  which  appears  to  be  compatible  with  the  objective  of  profitable 
trading.  The  Commission  services  are of  the opinion  that,  in  line with 
the  experience  in  the  Member  States  with  a  more  transparent  structure, 
greater awareness  of pricing does  not conflict with  commercial  objectives. 
72.  Consequently,  it invites the  Council  to confirm  the  need  for greater 
efforts  across  the  Member  Sta  tea  to  improve  transparency.  This  can  be 
achieved  if  relevant  information  is  made  available  to  the  Commission 
services to  enable it to reinforce  the  information  provided in its Pricing 
Bulletin.  This  information will,  of course,  be  published  in  a  way  which 
respects the  confidentiality of  individual clients  and utilities.  It is 
important to  make  progress  in this area. 
73.  In  addition  to  the  regular  series  of  pricing  information,  the 
Commission  services are undertaking,  and  will  continue  to analyse,  long-
term  trends  in  both  the  levels  and  the  structures  of  prices  for  the 
different fuels. 
Io-~~~~~-;-~~~;:~:-~~~~e trends  over  the period 1973-1984 in real  terms, 
examines  whether prices  are  converging  between  Member  States  and  gives  a 
comparison of relative real  energy prices per unit of useful  energy. 15 
74.  The  second  menno  of  improving  transparency  relates  to  the  different 
types  of  pricing  rogicen  in  operation  in  the  Community.  In  general 
throughout  the  Community,  domestic  1  small  and  medium-sized  industrial 
consumers  nrc,  for gas  and  electricity,  charged  on  the basis of published 
tariffs.  Large  consumers  are,  in some  Member  States,  charged  on  the basis 
of generally applicable tariffs,  with variations  according to the offtake 
conditions,  but  in  others  price  levels  are  set  on  the  basis  of  confi-
dential  contracts.  The  justification  for  this  latter pricing  regime  is 
often  based  on  the  argument  that  the  particular  conditions  for  different 
users  are  so  heterogeneous  that  a  tariff  structure  would  not  be  appro-
priate.  It is  also feared  that  if there  were  a  standard  tariff struc-
ture,  then  consumers  in  different  categories  would  continually  request 
that their particular prices should  be  aligned  downwards. 
75.  These  are  considerations  which  would  obviously  apply  throughout  the 
Corr.mun i ty,  and  yet  a  number  of  Member  Sta  teo  do  operate  a  generally-
applicable  tariff  system  for  larger  consumers.  The  Commission  services 
are not convinced  by  the arguments  against operating such  a  system. 
76.  In an  international trading community,  it is,  of course,  important  to 
remove  any  real  or  perceived  barriers  to  trade  in  the  interest  of better 
overall  economic  performance.  To  the  extent  that  there  are,  or  are 
believed  to  be  artificial  factors  offering  competitive  advantages,  the 
environment  within  which  trading  occurs  will  be  made  more  difficult  by 
continual  suspicion  that  competitors  are  benefitting  from  artificial 
pricing advantages. 
77.  To  overcome  these difficulties,  the  Commission  invites the  Council  to 
consider  the  case  for  a  new  recommendation  on  pricing  structures  in 
addition  to  the  existing  gas  and  electric!  ty  recommendations.  Speci-
fically,  this  would  lay  down  pricing guidelines for  large-consumer  cont-
racts  taking  account  of  the  technical  and  cost  characteristics  involved. 
Once  such  standardized  guidelines  were  in  operation  the  transparency 
situation  would  be  considerably  improved,  which  in  turn  would  increase 
confidence  in the existence of fair trading conditions. 
V - INTRACOMMUNITY  TRADE 
A.  GENERAL 
78.  The  account  of  specific  pricing practices  in  Section  III  above  has 
been  concerned  with  the  situation within  particular Member  States.  The 
agreed pricing principles are,  however,  Community  principles which  should 
apply  to  energy  trade  between  Member  States  as  well  as  to  sales  within 
particular countries. 
79.  The  aim  should  not,  however,  be  to  achieve  price  harmonisation 
throughout  the  Community.  There  will  always  be  real  differences  in 
supply  and  distribution costs  which will,  for instance,  benefit consumers 
of Dutch  gas  in the  Netherlands  as against other  (indirect)  custorrrs for 
such  gas  in  the  South  of  Germany.  In  its earlier  conclusions  ,  the 
Council  confirmed  that any  price differences  which  did  not correspond  to 
the  guidelines  it agreed  must  be  clearly  identified  and,  to  the extent 
11------~---------------
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that  they arise from  differences  in public policy,  progressively reduced. 
To  prcnerve  the unity  of' the  co!'!!I.On  cnrltet,  there:fore,  it io encentinl 
thnt priccn  f'or  trarumntionnl  energy  onlea  rrnould  nloo  be  bnncd  on  the 
ngreed  Co~ity  principlcn. 
B.  INTRA-COMMUNITY  ELECTRICITY  TRADE 
80.  fill  extensive  network  of  trans-frontier  electricity  interconnections 
has  been built up  over the years  by  the electricity utilities.  Electri-
city trading,  both  in  terms of mutual  exchange  and  of net transfer,  has 
continued  to increase  and  has  provided  both  security  and  economic  advan-
tages  to  the consumers. 
The  security  aspect  arises  in  rnost  cases  from  the  existence  of  spare 
transmiosion  capacity,  over  and  above  that  required for  normal  trading, 
\llhich  is available in  the event of r;ystem  or plant breakdown.  Economies 
flm-1  from  electrical  enerp,y  trading,  whether  on  a  mutual  exchnngc  basis 
at appropriate  times  depending  on  the  demand  pattern  on  ench  cide of the 
frontiero  or  in net energy  flows  from  cheaper production  r:;ources. 
81.  \<lhilst  transfrontier  trade  is normally  carried out  between  electri-
city utilities,  it is  nevertheless  both  logical  and  desirable  that  the 
prices  for  electrical  energy  transfers  should  be  based  on  the  energy 
pricing principles.  In  particular,  prices should  realistically reflect 
the costs of supply  and  should  be  such  as  to contribute  to  the  continuing 
financial viability of the suppliers.  Prices practised  in this area are 
not  currently trnnsparent.  The  Commission  invites  the  r~ember  States to 
provide assistnnce in achieving transparency. 
C.  INTRA-COMMUNITY  GAS  TRADE 
82.  At  present  the  major  cross-border  gas  trade  in  the  Community  stems 
from  the decision of the Netherlands  Government  some  years  ago  to  allow  a 
proportion  of  its  indigenoun  gas  resources  to  be  produced  for  export. 
Netherlands  gas  is currently  supplied  to  five  other Member  States,  spec-
ifically  to  Germany,  France,  Belgium,  Luxembourg  nnd  Italy.  Other 
intra-Community  gas  trade flows  will  develop  in  the  next  few  years,  for 
instance  between  Denmark  and  Germany,  and  between  Ireland  and  the  UK 
(Northern Ireland).  But unless  and until  UK  gas  production rises to  the 
point  of  providing  an  export  surplus,  the  supply  of  Netherlands  gas  is 
likely  to  remain  the  dominant  trade  flow  as  far  as  Community  gas 
resources are  concerned. 
83.  Although  the cross-border sale of Netherlands  gas  is in fact carried 
out  by  Gasunie,  this type of trade  should  clearly  be  regarded  as  falling 
within  the  category  of  bulk  sa  leo  by  gas  producers,  in  the  same  way  as 
gas exported  to the  Community  by  the  USSR,  Algeria  or  Norwny.  The  price 
charged  for  such sales will  therefore  tend  to  be  influenced  by  the inter-
national  (or regional)  gas  market  situation at the  time,  and  by  the  com-
petition between  alternative suppliers. 
While  the  framm10rk  within  which  Community  transfrontier  sales  operate 
will reflect this wider  geographical  range of sources,  the  two  principles 
of  realistic  pricing  and  non-discriminatjon  should  continue  to  guide 
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84.  Similarly,  these principles apply  to companies  producing gas  within 
the  Community  and selling either to utilities within their own  country  or 
those  located  in other  Member  States.  Of  course,  the  level  of  priceo 
charged will  differ,  e.g.  transmission costs,  etc.,  but  any  major  price 
divergence  between  internal  and  external  sales  by  producers  could  lead  to 
distortions  of  competition  between  industrial  consumers  in  different 
Member  States. 
85.  From  the  information  The  Commission  services  have  available,  it 
appears  that  the  Dutch  gas  border  price  lies within  an  acceptable range 
of prices  charged  to  large,  and  very large  industrial  consumers  in that 
Member  State. 
D.  TRADE  BARRIERS 
86.  Realistic pricing  is  of  course  only  one  of  the  factors  required  to 
ensure  an  optimum pattern of energy  trade between  Member  States.  Acceso 
is  another  important  consideration.  In  a  number  of  recent  Commun-
ications,  the  Commission  has  drawn  attention to the  need  for  an  effective 
transnational  in~rnntructure in  the  energy  field.  There  appear  to be  no 
major difficulties as  far as  trade  in oil and  coal  are  concerned,  but for 
gnn  and  electricity The  Commission  services  arestudying whether  there  is 
a  case  for  accelerated  development  of  cross-border  gas  pipelines  and 
electricity interconnections. 
87.  Another  factor  which  may  be  affecting  the  level  and  quality  of 
intra-Community  trade  in  gas  and  electricity  is  the  existence  of  the 
national  or local monopolies  which  control distribution  and  sales.  It is 
not  usually  open  to  a  particular  consumer  to  seek  supplies  on  better 
price  terms  from  another  utility or,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  gas, 
directly  from  a  gas  producer.  It is  of  course  clear  that  the  distri-
bution of  gas  or  electricity are  natural  monopoly  areas,  given  the pro-
hibitive cost  of building  duplicate facilities.  But  a  monopoly  of dis-
tribution  does  not  automatically  imply  a  monopoly  of  final  sales.  It 
would  be  feasible  to  divorce  the  two  activities,  at least partially,  by 
requiring  gas  or  electricity  distribution  companies  to  act  as  a  com=:on 
carrier  for  other  suppliers,  whether  located  in  the  same  country  or  in 
other  Member  States.  They  would  also of course  continue  to  transport  and 
sell  gas  or  electricity  themselves,  but  under  such  a  regime  the  final 
consumer  would  be  able  to  take  advantage of  competition  between  al  terna-
tive  suppliers.  Powers  to  enforce  a  common  carrier  regime  for natural 
gas  were  introduced  in the  UK  in  1982,  although it is too early to  judge 
the effects of this innovation. 
VI  - ROLE  OF  TAXATION 
88.  The  need  to  achieve  the basic  objectives of  the  ener!'.Y  pr.1c~ng prin-
ciples,  i.e.  realistic pricing,  transparency  and  a  contribution  to  the 
unity  of  the  common  market,  requires  that  the  role  of  taxation  in  this 
pol icy  area  should  be  clearly  recognized  as  a  very  important  element. 
This  consideration normally  applies  to oil products  since  (other  than  VAT) 
taxes  are not usually  levied on  other fuels.  The  Commission  has  drawn  the 
Council's  attention  to  the  interrelationship  between  taxation  and  energy 
pricing principles,  particularly in its Communication  of September  1981  in 18 
the  specific area of taxation of petroleum products12• 
on  this  document  and  also on  the  Commission's  original 
the harmonization of excise duties on  mineral  oils were 
But  the  discu~§ion 
1973  proposal  on 
both  inconclusive. 
89.  The  Commission  reminds  the  Council  of  the  five  practical  goals  it 
proposed  for oil product taxation  in the  1981  Communication: 
- agreement  on  the principle  that target  areas  should  be  set for  the 
tax burden  for  each  major  category  of product  (i.e.  the  m~n~mum and 
maximum  incidence  in  relation  to  the  prices  net  of  tax  for  all 
excise  duties  and  VAT),  so  as  to  have  a  direct  impact  on  their 
price  structures  which  brings  them  more  into  line  with  energy  ob-
jectives; 
a  joint  decision  of  the  rate  of  progression  of  the  overall  tax 
burden  (excise  dutien  +  VAT)  towards  the  target  areas  and  to 
achieve  a  better balance  between  excise  duties  and  VAT.  It would 
be  necessary  to  ensure that changes  in the  tax burden  remain at all 
times  in line with  target areas; 
a  joint  agreement  on  the  need  to  adapt  excise  duties  regularly, 
without however  revising the level  more  than  once  a  year; 
- adoption  of  the principle  of gradual  abolition,  following  a  time-
table jointly agreed,  of exemptions,  subsidies  and  tax reductions 
for  particular  uses  where  there  is  no  longer  any  valid  reason  for 
keeping  them; 
a  decision  that  the  Council  should  review  annually  the  trends  in 
energy  and  particularly  oil  taxes  (both  structures  and  rates)  to 
assess  to  what  extent  they  contribute  to  achieving  the  objectives 
of economic  and  enerps  policy. 
90.  These  goals  remain  relevant  today. 
particular,  on  tackling 
Their  achievement  depends,  in 
the  diversity  of  tax  structures  in  operation  in  the  different 
Member  States,  and 
the  lack  of  consistency  in  the  rates  charged  under  different  tax 
headings. 
91.  The  general  harmonisation  programme  proposed  by  The  Commission  for 
taxes  on  consumption  envisages  in  a  first  phase  harmonisation  of  tnx 
ntructurcn  and  in  a  second  phase  the harmonisation  of rntcn.  The  impor-
tance  of structural  hnrmoninntion  for  the  energy  sector is highlighted by 
the following examples: 
Some  Member  States  apply  only  the  deductible  value  added  tax  nt  the 
normal  rate  to  heating  fuels  and  have  suspended  the  levy  of  excise 
duty  on  those fuels,  whilst the other  Member  States levy  (non-deduct-
12 _____________________ _ 
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ible)  excir;c  duty  on  heating  fuels  pJ.uo  VAT.  So,  it is  onl;y  the 
non-business user  of'  those  ruels  in  the  former  countries  vtho  hear the 
tax burden.  This  can  cause  distortions  of competition. 
Another  example  of  an  important  structural  difference  is  where  the 
same  excise  rate  on  gasoil  is  npplied  notwithstanding  its  use  as 
I•Jotor  propellant  or as  heating fuel,  rather thun  the usual  practice 
of subjecting the  two  different uses  to different tax burdens. 
92.  Besides  the  differences  in  the  structure  of  excise  duties  mentioned 
above,  distortions  of the  energy  market  arise also  from  differing  levels 
of VAT  and  excise duty rntes on  oil products.  For automotive  light oils, 
the  VAT  rates vary  from  12%  to  25%  and  the  excise  duties  vary  from  0,194 
ECU/litre  to 0,459  ECU/litre.  For  automotive  gasoil,  the  excise duties 
vary  from  0,044  ECU/1  to  0,244  ECU/1.  The  excise  duties  on  heating oils 
differ  even  more  (from  0  to  88,3  ECU/1  for  heating gasoil  and  0  to  50,00 
ECU/1  for  residual fuel oil). 
93.  The  incidence of tax has  eroded  through  time  in  many  cases.  With  the 
exception of heating  oil,  the  incidence of  tax  on  the different  oil pro-
ducts  has  declined,  in  some  casco  substantially,  over  the  period  1973-
1983.  There  has  therefore been  a  restructuring of the  effective prices  to 
consumers  by  the  accident  of  inflation,  rather  than  by  any  clear  policy 
objective.  The  achievement of the overall  energy objectives,  particularly 
on  oil dependency,  could  be  influenced  by  this situation. 
94.  The  Commission  services  areconscious  that  the  role  of  taxation  in 
energy pricing policy is complex,  both  in  terms  of intra-fUel  competition 
and  in  competition  between  users  of  the  same  fuel  in  different  Member 
States.  But  differences  such  as  those outlined above  would  of course  tend 
to  override  the  effects  of  a  realistic  energy  pricing  policy.  The 
Commission  services aretherefore  of the  opinion  that  unless  a  new  initia-
tive  is  taken  in  the  taxation  area,  the  objective  of  a  more  effective 
pricing policy could  be  jeopardized. 
95.  Consequently,  it invites  the  Council  to  endorse  the  important rela-
tionship  between  pricing policy  and  taxation  and  to agree that discussions 
should,  as  a  first step,  be  reopened  on  harmonization of excise  duties  on 
mineral oil. 
VII  - CONCLUSIONS 
96.  In  its  previous  discussions  of  energy  pr1c1ng,  the  Council  invited 
the  Commission  to study  the application  of the  Community's  energy  pricing 
principles.  The  present Communication  is the result of that remit  and  of 
the  enquiries  which  have  since  been  pursued  with  Member  States.  For 
reasons  which  are explained,  The  Commission  services have  concentrated its 
work  nt  thin  otnge  on  the  gas  and  electricity  sectors.  The  survey  has 
revealed  a  number  of  transparency  difficulties  and  has  also  identified 
some  complex  problems which  will require  further analysis.  More  work  by 
The  Commission  services  and  Member  States  will  therefore  be  needed  to 
obtain a  comprehensive picture  of the  situation.  The  Paper  does  however 
seek  to  highlight  particular  sources  of  difficulty  which  appear  to  merit 
Council  discussion.  These  are: 20 
i)  situations  in  which  the  application  of  the  Community's  energy 
pricing  principles  is set  aside  in  favour  of  other  social  or econ-
omic  policy objectives; 
ii) cases  where  gas  or  electricity utilities  are  failing  to  achieve  or 
restore overall  financial  viability; 
iii)  the  risk  that  market-related,  rather  than  cost-related  pricing  by 
monopoly utilities could generate unnecessary  surplus  revenues: 
iv)  differences  in  pricing  practices  leading  to  discrimination  between 
particular consumers; 
v)  situations in which  monopoly utilities,  through cross-subsidisation 
or other means,  may  be charging industrial  consumers prices which  do 
not fully  cover supply costs; 
vi)  the need  to further price transparency  by  improving access  to  infor-
mation  and  by  introducing guidelines  for  large  industrial  contracts; 
vii)  situations,  particularly  in  the  oil  sector,  where  differences  in 
taxation levels obscure  the objectives of realistic energy pricing. AKNEX  1 
IIWORJIATIOll  COllCRRI'UlfG  ELECTRICITY  AND  GAS  PRICIRG  PRACTICES  m  THE 
mmBER  STA'l'ES 
A.  GENERAL  REMARKS 
1.  For the reasons  explained  in Chapter II,  this survey  does  not give  a 
detailed  desription  of  the  pricing  practices  in  the  Member  States. 
Rather  it is  a  summary  of  information  supplied  by  governments  about 
electricity  and  gas  prices  which  concentrates  on  the  following  two 
aspects:  the  financial viability  of undertakings  and  the  allocation 
of  costs  among  the  various  categories  of  consumer.  As  the  answers 
were  fairly variable  in scope,  the  information has  been  supplemented 
from  other sources where  possible. 
B.  FINANCIAL  VIABILITY 
2.  The  financial  viability of  undertakings,  especially  where  long-term 
investment  is  a  major  requirement,  depends  on  a  number  of factors, 
which vary  in  importance  from  case to case.  For  evaluation purposes, 
therefore, it is not enough  to  ask whether prices are high  enough  for 
a  suitable profit to  be  earned.  Other factors  must  also  be  taken  into 
account,  such  as  whether  the  rate  of  inflation  is  in  calculating 
depreciation,  the relation between  share  and  loan capital with regard 
to  capital  costs,  and  the  significance  of  the  annual  result  in the 
context  of  the  mul tiannual.  requirement  for  finance.  The  requisite 
criteria  cannot  all  be  given  equal  consideration  here.  The  survey 
merely  suggests,  to  the  extent  that  data  are  available,  that  the 
relation between  profit and  turnover is the key  ratio.  All  the infor-
mation  on  profit and  loss set out below  relates  to  the net operating 
results,  i.e.  less interest payments  and  tax.  There  are still prob-
lems  of comparabiliy,  however,  since the rules on  compiling balance 
sheets  vary  in  respect  of  other  factors  which  influence  the  annual 
result,  such  as  depreciation  (at  historic/replacement  cost),  the 
purchase  price of the  gas,  and  taxes  on  gas  extraction.  Any  accurate 
evaluation requires  these  problems  to  be  examined  in detail,  which it 
has not  been possible to do  in this inquiry. 
I. Electricity 
3.  The  Delginn  Government  stresses  that the  purpose of electricity tar-
iffs is  to ensure  financial viability  of the  industry  and  pursuit of 
its  investment  programme  without  calling  on  aid  from  the  public 
authorities.  The  fact that false depreciation costs of nuclear units 
under construction are particularly taken into account  in the current 
period is to be  seen  in this  conext.  In  1982,  generation and distri-
bution  combined  showed  a  profit of FB  5  900  million,  or 6.2% of turn-
over. - 2-
4.  The  Dnnieh  Government  stat  eo  that  the  ruleG  on  electricity  tariffs, 
which  are  laid down  in the  Electricity and  Heating Supply  Act,  pro-
vide  electricity  suppliers  with  a  sound  financial  basis  since  they 
allow  them  to recoup all their costs  through their prices,  and  still 
have  a  margin  for future  investment.  The  electricity supply  industry 
is  organized  in  a  fairly  decentralized manner,  and  an  overall  quan-
tified estimate of its financial  position is not available. 
5.  The  Gc~nn  Government  reports  that  a  satisfactory  profit  and  an 
adequate  return  on  capital  invested  are  a  fundamental  feature  of 
Germany's  privatc-cector electricity industry.  Bet·ween  1977  and  1981 
tho  industry recorded  an  average profit of 2.9% of revenue  from  sales 
to conoumers  and  distributors. 
6.  In  Greece,  the DEI  (Public  Power  Corporation)  continued  to revise its 
electricity  priceo,  with  increases  in revenue  averaging  25%  in 1982 
and  24%  in  1983.  Ho111ever,  only  in  1982  was  the  increase appreciably 
higher than the rise in operating costs - high  enough,  in fact,  for 
the  undertaking  to  record  its  first-ever  operating  profit: 
DR  638  million,  or 0.7% of turnover.  In  1983 the Government  expected 
the tmdertaking to break even,  disregarding accumulated  losses.  With 
this  improvement  in its financial  situation,  the undertaking reckoned 
that  in  1983 it would  vi.rtually  achieve  its  objective of  self-finan-
cing one  quarter of its investment. 
7.  In France,  EdF  managed  in  1983  to  reverse  the slide which  had  led it 
to  nccumulate  operating  losses  totalling  FF  13  500  million  between 
1979  nnd  1982.  The  French Government's  provisional  figures  for  1983 
indicate  that  the  operating  loss  has  been  brought  down  to 
FF  4  600 million  from  the  FF  7  900  million,  or  8.4%  of  turnover, 
recorded  in  1982.  Two  increases  in  the  average  price  of  elec-
tricity - 8%  in  April  1983  and  3.  5%  in  September  - contributed  to 
this relative  improvement. 
8.  A  further  increase  of  5%  on  average,  which  came  into  effect  in 
February  1984,  ought,  in the opinion of the  Government  to  bring EdF's 
trading account  for  the current year  into balance. 
9.  At  the  same  time,  the  Government  expects  a  higher  self-financing 
ratio as  a  result  (45%  to  50%  compared  with  25%  in recent  years)  and 
a  lower  burden  of  debt  (FF  28  000  million  in  1984  as  against 
FF  40  000 million  in 1983). 
10.  The  French  Government  emphasizes  that in  the  long run  consumer prices 
must  cover  production costs.  However,  it also stresses  the  need  to 
use  prices as  a  means  of controlling inflation. 
11.  In  Irclnnd,  the Electricity  Supply  Board  ( ESB) ,  after  two  posi ti  vc 
financial years,  ended  1982/3 with  a  new  loss of  IRL  5.7 million,  or 
1%  of  turnover.  This  brought  its  cumulative  deficit  to 
IRL  14.1 million.  Following  the  1983  electricity  price  increase, 
however,  the  Irish  Government  feels  that  the  ESB  is  now  in  a  sound 
financial  position:  not  only  do  its  prices  cover  all  its  running 
production costs  but they  also  leave  a  wide  enough  margin  to finance 
25%  to  30%  of the Board's new  investment. - 3-
12.  According to  the Itnlinn  Government's  information,  ENEL's  financial 
position has  deteriorated recently,  not only under the  impact of the 
increases in  fuel-oil prices  and of  the higher  exchange rate  for  the 
dollar,  but also  because of  the cost  of servicing  the undertaking's 
heavy  debt.  The  main  reason  for  this  debt  is  that  ENEL  has  under-
charged for its electricity in the past.  From  1976  onwards  only,  the 
financing of  investment  and  the compensation  of the  old  nationalized 
electricity undertakings have  qualified for capital erants.  In  1981, 
all such grants were  worth  15.4% of fixed assets. 
13.  The  tariff  increases  granted  by  the  Interministerial  Committee  on 
Prices  (CIP)  in  1982 were  too  low  to reduce  the operating loss.  This 
amounted  to  LIT  2  433  thousand  million,  or  18%  of revenue,  including 
contributions referring to the  "thermal  supplement". 
14.  In  1982,  ENEL  produced  a  four-part stabilization plan.  In the first 
stage - 1982  - the  liquidity crisis  was  resolved  through  tariff in-
creases  and  Government grants.  The  second stage - 1983  - should see 
a  return  to  self-financing  after  an  interval  of  two  years,  as  a 
result of revenue  being  well  above  costs.  The  third  stage - 1984  -
should result in  a  balanced  trading account,  provided  the Government 
gives  the  go-ahead  for  a  further  increase  in  the  tariffs  to  non-
domestic  users  and continues  to  pay  the grant.  In  the fourth stage, 
which  covers  a  longer  period,  it  is  planned  to  restructure  the 
sources of finance  (self-financing,  capital grants,  and  borrowing). 
15.  The  Luxec.bourg  Government  reports  that  Cegedel  charges  enough  to 
provide  a  sound  financial  basis for  funding  a  major  long-term  invest-
ment  programme  through  a  combination  of  self-financing,  loans  and 
capital stock increases. 
16.  In  the Jlcthcrlnndn,  the electricity industry,  which  is fairly decen-
tralized,  is  profitable  overall.  Quoting  the  Central  Statistical 
Office's figures  for  1979,  the Government gives  an  average profit of 
4.  4%  of  turnover  as  the  most  recent  overall  result  available.  It 
estimateo that this would  be  about  3%  in  1982.  There  appears  to  he 
no  provioion  for  a  general  rise  in electricity  prices before  the  enc}. 
of 1985. 
17.  The  United  Kingdon  Government  reports  that  electricity  pr1c1ng  ref-
lects  long-term  marginal  costs.  It regards  this  practice  as  econ-
omically sound  and  consistent with  Community  objectives.  In  the last 
ten years  the  increase  in average  electricity prices has  been greater 
than  the rate of inflation - a  trend which reflects,  inter alia,  the 
attempt  to  move  from  a  pol icy  of  prices  held  down  for  non-energy 
reasons  to  a  method  of price  setting which  ensures  that  electric:itty 
undertakings are financially viable.  Accordingly,  electricity prices 
are  determined  by  certain financial  objectives  and  limits on  external 
financing  laid  down  by  the  Government.  In  1982/3  the  Electricity 
Council  recorded  an  operating profit  (current cost accounting)  of UKL 
332  million,  or  3.6% of turnover. - 4  -
2.  Gas 
18.  The  Dclginn  Government  stresses  that  the  purpose  of  its  gas  tariffs 
is  to  ensure  that  the  industry  is  financially  viable  and  can  pursue 
its  investment  programme  without  calling  on  aid  from  the  public 
authorities.  In  1983,  Distrigaz registered  a  net  profit of  FB  580 
million,  or nearly  o.~~ of turnover,  at an  average  purchase price of 
about  FB  200  (4.5 ECU)  per GJ. 
19.  A  major  problem  is  the  gro\'ling  share  of  the  market  being  taken  by 
relatively high-priced Algerian  gas;  at 6.5 ECU  per GJ,  this gas  is 
50%  more  expensive  on  average  than  Dutch  and  Norwegian  gas.  A tem-
porary  arrangement  has  been  reached  to  cut  back  deliveries.  Not 
until  October  1985  will  supplies  now  be  stepped  up  to  the 
5  000  million m3  a  year  originally  agreed  in  the  supply  contracts. 
However,  renegotiation  of  the  Algerian  gas  contract  is  apparently 
being contemplated for late 1985. 
20.  The  Danioh  Government  says  that the  pr1c1ng rules  in the  Electricity 
and  Heating  Supply  Act  ensure  that  undertakings  can  be  managed  on  a 
sound  financial  basis.  It stresses,  however,  that the natural  gas 
grid is still at a  very  early stage of development  and  that the  fixed 
component  of  the  two-part  tariffs  accounts  for  a  smaller  proportion 
of the total  gas  price  than  the  fixed  costs  warrant.  In  accordance 
with  point  a.4  of  the  Recommendation  on  natural  gas  pricec,  this 
variant  of the  two-part tariff system  is  warranted  since  it reflects 
the  local conditions applying during the  development  phase. 
21.  The  Gercnn  Government  stresses  that,  as  regards  small  domestic  and 
industrial consumers,  German  gas  undertakings are free  to set selling 
prices provided  that  they  are set within the  published  tariffs.  As 
regards large industrial  consumers  and  power  stations,  prices are  the 
subject  of  individual  negotiations  which  are  determined  by  the  com-
petition  from  alternative forms  of enerps.  Given  such  competition, 
the private gas  companies will accept only  a  gas  purchase price which 
allows  them  to sell  to the  end user  under satisfactory  economic  con-
ditions. 
22.  The  Greek  Government  has  sent no  information on  gas  pricing since  the 
Greek natural gas  supply network  is still at an  early  ntage  of devel-
opment. 
23.  In  1983,  Gnz  de  Frnnce  (GdF)  registered  a  record  operating  loss  of 
FF  2  500  million.  Deopite  an  average  increase  in  gas  tariffs  of  5% 
in  February  1984,  an  operating  deficit  for  1984  as  high  as 
FF  4  000  million is not out of the  question. 
24.  Several  factors  contribute  to  this  deterioration:  surplus  stocks of 
gas -the result of excess availabilities - create a  financial  burden 
of FF  150 million  a  year;  the rise  in  the  dollar exchange  rate con-
tinues  to  increase  the  cost  of  purchase;  and  the  cost  overrun  of 
Algerian  gas  - an  estimated  FF  1  500  million  in 1984  - has  been  borne 
by  GdF  alone  since the beginning of this year. 
25.  As  regards  measures  to  reduce  annual  operating  losses,  or  even 
recover  the  losses  accumulated  in  the  past,  the  French  Government 
recognizes  that  in  the  long  run  prices  must  cover  costs  in  their - 5-
entirety.  At  the  nom~ time,  however,  it stresseo  the need  for  com-
petitive  prices  vi s-n-vis  competing  formr;  of  energy  if  gns  is  to 
maintain its shore of the enerrs  market. 
26.  The  Irinh  Government  states  that  the  Irish  Gas  Board's  finances  are 
healthy,  with  revenue  covering all the Board's currently supply  costs 
and  leaving  a  margin  of  between  25%  and  30%  to  finnnce  new  invest-
ment.  Purchasing its gas at around 1.1  ECU  per GJ,  the  Board  in 1982 
recorded  a  net  profit  after  tax  of  IRL  29.4  million,  or  27.3%  of 
turnover. 
27.  In Itnly,  the gas  industry publishes  uniform,  nationwide tariffs and 
prices  are  moni tared  by  the  Interministerial  Committee  on  Prices 
(CIP).  The  industry is organized  in  such  a  way  that there are  three 
different  pricing  systems.  First,  the  prices  agreed  between  SNAM 
(the  transmission  company)  and  the local  distributors depend  in part 
on  a  number  of cost items  including procurement,  transmission,  stor-
age,  distribution and  load  factor.  In addition,  prices are regularly 
adjusted  in line with  the ex-tax price of heating oil, subject to  CIP 
approval.  Prices for deliveries of local distributors  to  the  domes-
tic  sector  and  small  industrial  users  are  determined  under  a  pro-
cedure  agreed  by  the  CIP  and  the municipal  undertakings  which  ensures 
that  the  latter  make  a  profit.  The  prices  are  based  on  the  quan-
ti  ties  supplied.  As  for  SNAM' s  direct  sales  to  large  industrial 
consumers,  the  variable  component  of  the  tariff  is  adjusted  every 
month  in  line  with  the  prices  for  a  "basket"  of  heavy  fuel  oils, 
which  the  fixed  component  is  adjusted  for  inflation  once  a  quarter. 
In  the  case  of  interruptible  supplies  to  power  stations  or  other 
industrial users,  the link with  the  movement  in the price of fuel  oil 
refers only to  the high-sulphur content variety. 
28.  Taken  as  a  whole,  this  pricing system  guarantees,  according  to  the 
Italian  Government,  that  SNAM  remains  profitable  (profits  in  1983 
were  LIT  72  000  million).  It Ghould  be  mentioned,  however,  that  SNAM 
receives  financial  support  from  the  Goverment  for  importing  Algerian 
gas,  support which  is due  to expire  in 1986. 
29.  In  Luxe~bourg,  gas  transmission  and  distribution undertakings accor-
ding  to  the  Government  finance  the  infrastructure  which  they  need 
from  their sales profits. 
30.  In  the  fletherlandn,  Gasunie,  which  is responsible  for  transmission 
and  also sells direct to the largest users,  recorded  a  net profit in 
1983  of HFL  80 million,  or  0.3% of turnover,  on  the basis of a  pur-
chase cost of around 3.8 ECU  per GJ.  Quoting  the Central Statistical 
Office's  published figures  for  1979  - the  latest results  available  -
the  Government  gives  a  net  profit  of  about  6.5%  of  turnover  for  the 
average  of  local  distributors.  In  the  Government's  view,  however, 
this overall  figure  is not wholly  reliable,  given the way  the  indus-
try  is  organized:  there  are  a  great  many  link-up  schemes  between 
various  communes,  or with  other types of public services. 
31.  The  United  Kingdom  Government  reports  that  the  British  Gas  Corpor-
ation's  prices  take  into  account  both  prevailing  market  conditions, 
the  longer-term  cost  of  continuing  supply  including  an  adequate 
return  on  the  capital  invested.  Two  price  increases  were  made  in - 6  -
1982  - one  averaging  10%,  the  other  12%.  In  the  1982/3  tax  year, 
British  Gas  recorded  a  net  profit  of  UKL  188.4  million,  or  3.2%  of 
turnover,  based  on  a  gas  purchase cost of 2  ECU  per GJ. 
C.  ALLOCATION  OF  COSTS  AMONG  CONSUMERS 
1.  Electricity 
32.  Delgilm:  The  Belgian Government  emphasizes  the  fundamental  principle 
whereby  price  structure must  reflect the  reality of  the  costs  gener-
ated  by  each  type of consumption  as  accurately as  possible.  Accord-
ingly,  the tariffs for direct industrial customers have  been altered 
to  take  account  of  the  introduction  into  service  of  nuclear  gener-
ating units.  In  addition,  the  partial  indexing  of prices  has  been 
replaced  by  integral  indexing,  which  includes  a  capital cost compon-
ent.  In  1982,  however,  industrial  customers  enjoyed  an  overall 
advantage of some  FB  3  000 million,  due  notably to the  impact of the 
nuclear  sector  being  reckoned  too  soon  and  integral  indexing  being 
introduced only gradually. 
33.  Denmark:  According to  the  Commission  on  Prices,  which  is notified of 
changes  in  prices  and  the  conditions  of  sale,  Danish  prices  do 
reflect  the  coots  associated  with  the  different  categories  of  con-
sumer  and  thus  satisfY  the  requirements  of Article  1  of  the  Council 
Recommendation  on  Electricity Tariffs. 
34.  Gen:mny:  The  Federal  Order  on  Electricity  Tariffs 
(Bundestarifordnung-Elektrizitat)  requires  that  the  principle  of 
cost-related prices be  followed:  each  consumer  or group  of consumers 
must  bear the  supply costs which he/it generates.  Whereas  the prices 
for  deliveries  to  the  domestic  sector and  small  industrial  users are 
published  in  tariffs  which  require  the  approval  of  the  Federal  or 
Land  authorities,  non-tariff sales  to  industrial  consumers  are  not 
subject to  such supervision.  However,  Antitrust  Law  represents  an 
important  means  of  abolishing  discriminatory  pricing.  The  Federal 
Government  emphasizes  in  particular  that  any  practice  which  is 
designed  to tie an  industrial  consumer  to a  specific power  station is 
regarded  as  infringing the principle  of'  non-discrimination.  Yet  this 
principle  does  not  prevent  consumers  with  a  high  rate  of  capacity 
utilization  from  profiting  from  the  favourable  production  costs  of 
base-load power stations  (brown  coal  and  nuclear). 
35.  According  to  certain  press  reports,  Hamburgische Elektrizitatswerke 
AG  (HEW)  charges  one  aluminium plant,  for  instance,  2.0 p:fennigs  per 
kWh  - compare  this  price  with  the  cost of  just the  fuel  in  the case 
of nuclear-generated  electricity,  which  it is  estimated  will  be  at 
least  2. 5  pfennigs  per  kWh  in  future.  It  is  legitimate  to  wonder 
whether  such  a  price  covers  all  directly  attributable  costs  (i.e. 
variable costs plus  meter charges,  etc.). 
36.  Greece:  As  with all energy  sources,  electricity prices are  fixed  by 
a  ministerial  committee  (KYSYM)  on  a  proposal  from  the  Minister  for 
Energy  and  take  account of energy,  economic  and  social factors. - 7-
37.  The  Government  states  that  it  attaches  particular  importance  to 
whether  the  price  charged  to  the  aluminium  industry  is  compatible 
with  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  recommendation  on  electric!  ty 
tariffs.  The. matter  is  curr.ently  being  reviewed  by  the  competent 
authorities. 
38.  France:  According to  the  Government,  tariff structures are  designed 
to  reflect  the  structure  of  the  long-term  marginal  costs  associated 
with the  different types  of consumer.  Tariff structure changes  are 
under  review to see whether,  as regards  large  industrial users,  the 
penetration  of  nuclear  generated  electricity  cannot  be  better 
expressed. 
39.  In  January  1984,  EdF  and  Pechiney  Ugine  Kuhlmann  (PUK)  signed  an 
agreement,  retroactive to  1  January,  relating to the purchase  by  PUK 
of  about  220  MW  of  nuclear  capacity.  The  purchase  price  of  this 
capacity reflects the cost of developing  a  major power  station.  PUK 
is  to  receive  electricity  at  operating  cost,  excluding  capital 
charges but including transmission costs,  i.e.  at a  rate of 13  cen-
times  per  kWh.  Some  parts  of  the  agreement  are  still provisional. 
It has not yet been  decided,  inter alia,  whether this capacity will 
be  a  fraction  of  a  particular power  station or may  be  drawn  from  more 
than one.  In the  former  case,  PUK  could be  regarded  as  a  self-pro-
ducer  and  problems  of  discrimination  could  hardly  arise;  in  the 
latter,  however,  with a  contract period of 25 years,  PUK  would  enjoy 
special conditions  denied  to other users. 
40.  Ireland:  The  Irish  Government  stresses  that the  Electricity Supply 
Board  has  gradually  removed  any  element  of  cross-subsidization  be-
tween  the  various  consumer  categories  and  that  all  tariffs  cover  at 
least the long-term marginal  costs. 
41.  Italy:  Prices are  fixed  by  the  Interministerial  Committee  on  Prices 
(CIP)  within  a  system of single national  tariffs for  each category of 
consumer.  The  Italian  Government  would  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
that the tariffs for  the various  categories of consumer,  are  based  on 
objective  components  such  as  voltage,  subscribed  demand  and  utiliz-
ation rate. 
42.  Lwc.e~bour~:  New  tariffs  were  introduced  on  1  January  1982  with  a 
view  to  reflecting  more  accurately  the  distribution  costs  generated 
by  the various  categories of  usc.  The  quantity  discounts available 
to certain medium- and high-voltage  customers have  been  abolished. 
43.  Netherlando:  Tariffs are  determined  jointly  by  electricity distri-
butors  and are  approved  by  the Government.  Their structure generally 
reflects  the  cost  of  supplying  the  various  consumers.  Where  there 
are  still  minor  exceptions  to  this  rule,  structures  are  gradually 
being adapted. 
44.  United Kingdom:  With  a  view  notably to  avoiding discrimination  be-
tween  various  categories of consumer,  prices are  linked  to  long-term 
marginal  coots. 
Further  to  the  Government's  request,  the  Electricity 
assisted by  independent experts,  has  examined  the particular 
arising from  possible changes  in Bulk  Supply Tariff  (BST). 
Council, 
problems 
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elusion  to  this  analysis  recommend  that  tho  DST  should  continue to  be 
based on  long-term marginal  costs  and  that a  contracted  consumer  load 
scheme  should  be  applied  for  a  "test"  period  of  three  years.  The 
scheme  provides  for  substantial  price  reductions  for  consumers  who 
are  prepared  to cut  their demand  by  at  least  25%  for  a  period  of  60 
hours  between  October  and  March  and  has  been  favourably  received  by 
the large  industrial consumers.  It should  help  to restrain  the up-
vmrd  trend  in  prices  to  this  category  of  consumer  to  a  considerable 
extent. 
2.  Gas 
45.  This  section focuses  first on  the  main  points arising from  the state-
ments  and  general  information  submitted  by  governments  to  the 
Commission  services  before  going  on  to  discuss  pricing  in  specific 
areas  such  as  gas  supplies  to  power  stations  and  the  chemicals 
industry. 
(a)  Country-by-Country  Survey 
46.  Bclgiuc:  For  supplies to the domestic  sector and  to  small  industrial 
users,  gas  tariffs  include  a  system  of  indexing  prices  which  takes 
account  of all  the various  cost components.  Large  industrial users 
are supplied direct by  Distrigaz  in accordance with  supply  contracts. 
The  calculation  formula  used  in  these  contracts  takes  account,  in 
addition  to the  cost components,  of the  competition  from  alternative 
forms  of  energy  and  distinguishes  between  "specific"  and  "non-spec-
ific" uses  of gas  - for  the  latter,  residual  fuel  oil  provides  the 
alternative.  Depending on  the quantities  taken off  (reduction factor 
( K))  and  the  usc  to  which  the  gas  is  put  (conversion  factor  ( P)) 
prices  may  range  from  90%  to  110%. 
47.  Denmark:  With  a  view  to developing  a  new  natural  gas  supply grid,  an 
amendment  made  in  1982  to  the  Supply of  Heat  Act  specifically allows 
prices  to  be  differentiated  by  the  consumer,  group  of  consumers  or 
geographical  area,  provided  "reasonable  financial  principles"  are 
applied.  Prices  are  subject  to  a  ceiling aligned  with  equivalent 
fuel-oil  prices. 
48.  Gercnny:  The  Federal  Government  stresses  that price  setting is  the 
sole  responsibility  of  the  transmission  and/or  distribution  under-
takings.  The  Bundestarifordnung  (BTO)  Gas  (Federal  Tariff  order) 
obliges  undertakings  to supply  the  domestic  sector and  (other)  small 
consumers  in  accordance  with  published  tariffs  which  include  a 
heating-oil reference  component.  Gas  is sold  to  industrial  customers 
under  individual  contracts  which  take  the  prices  of  the  various  al-
ternative  forms  of  energy  into  account,  to  ensure  that  gas  is  com-
petitive.  The  alternative  energy  source  protects  the  industrial 
consumer  against  a  monopoly  gas  price  set  at  a  level  unwarranted  by 
costs.  In  addition,  Antitrust  Law  is regarded  as  an  important weapon 
against  any  abuse  of a  dominant position. 
49.  Greece:  No  details were  submitted  by  the  Government  of Greece,  where 
the natural  gas  supply network  is still in ito  infancy. - 9  -
50.  France:  All  firm  sales  from  the  transmission  and  distribution net-
works  are covered  by  published tariffs based  on  the principle of fair 
treatment  for  all  customers.  The  differences  between  the  tariffs 
reflect  the  differences  in  the  cost  of  the  services  provided.  In 
addition,  the  tariffs  are  indexed-linked  to  the  competing  forms  of 
energy,  namely  heavy  fuel  oil and  French  coal  where  supplies  to in-
dustry are  concerned. 
51.  Ireland:  Ireland is in the process of developing its own  indigenous 
production  capnci  ty  with  a  transmissi.on  and  distribution  network  to 
match.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  Irish  Government  feels  that 
Ireland's  natural  gas  prices  should  take  account  of  these  special 
local conditions,  as  allowed  by  the  Council  Recommendation  on natural 
gas prices.  A strategy calling for uniformity  in  terms  of prices  and 
conditions of  supply  would  not fit  in with  the gas  policy objectives 
pursued,  least  of all  with  the  need  to  sell  enough  to  finance  the 
heavy  investment  envisaged  during  this  initial  phase.  Prices  to 
local distributors  and  for direct sales  to  industry are  linked to oil 
prices.  As  to the gas  supplied to  power  stations,  the price is set 
between the equivalent prices of fuel  oil and  coal. 
52.  Itnly:  One  of the  CIP's monitoring  duties  is  to ensure  that prices 
comply  with certain energy policy criteria.  As  regards  the  domestic 
sector,  there is  the  further  criterion that  the purchasing  power of 
the less well-off must  be  protected.  Prices for  deliveries  to  indus-
trial  consumers  reflect  the  cost  differences  resulting  from  the 
nature of the  supply  (volume,  utilization time,  etc.).  They  are  also 
related  to  various  grades  of  heavy  fuel  oil  - gas  bought  under  firm 
supply  contracts  which  sells  on  average  at  approximately  15%  above 
high-sulphur heavy  fuel  oil. 
53.  Luxc~bourg:  The  Luxembourg  Government  stresses  the need  for natural 
gas,  in its various applications,  to remain  competitive with alter-
native  fuels  and  is  concerned  at  the  prospects  for  further  pene-
tration of  the market  by  this  energy  form.  It wonders  how  far  the 
recent  practice  of  linking  natural  gas  prices  to  oil  prices  is jus-
tified in  the  long  term,  assuming  that oil will gradually  leave  the 
heating market  as  oil prices  move  further  ahead of coal  prices. 
54.  Uetherlnndn:  Gas  prices,  according to the Government,  are  based  on 
the  market  value  principle,  which  implies  that  the  price  of  rival 
forms  of energy is taken as the reference  level. 
55.  This  means  that  the  price  to  small  consumers  is  linked  to  the price 
of  domestic  heating  oil,  while  gas  prices  to  high-consumption  cus-
tomers  are tied directly to heavy  fuel-oil prices.  In addition,  when 
prices are  rising fast,  the  rate  at which  gas  prices  are  increased 
also  depends  on  the  situation in  the  branch  of industry  concerned as 
a  whole.  Horticulture  is  one  example  where  prices  have  gradually 
been  increased  to  much  higher levels. 
56.  United  Kingdon:  The  "realistic  pricing"  approach  followed  by  the 
Government  is  designed  to  minimize  any  distortion  which  might  occur 
if prices  were  too  low  (wastage  of  a  limited  energy  source)  or  too 
high  (inviting  overcapacity  on  the  supply  side).  Accordingly,  it 
takes  the  market  structure  into  account  by  maintaining  that  prices 
should  reflect  market  pressures  where  reasonably  open  markets  exist - 10  -
or  should  reflect  the  cost  of  supply  in  all  other  cases.  In 
addition,  price  differentiation is  a  function  of cost  criteria such 
as  the  quantity  demanded  and  the  regularity  with  which  it  is  con-
sumed. 
57.  For  these reasons,  the recent increases  in natural gas  prices varied 
from  one  sector to another.  Between  1980  and  1983 British Gas  raised 
its prices to  domestic  users  by  10%  more  than  the inflation rate each 
year.  In  some  cases,  however,  these price increases have  been  accom-
panied  by  assistance towards  heating costs in an  effort to soften the 
impact  on  the less well-off.  At  the  same  time,  prices  for supplies 
to  industry  have  been  raised  less  nharply  so  as  to reflect  the cyc-
lical fall in demand  and  the trend  in the price of oil-product alter-
natives. 
(b)  Gas  sales to  power stations 
58.  Recent  shifts  in  the  energy  market  and  ununual  regional  conditions 
have  produced  a  tendency  to  burn  more  surplus  natural  gns  in  power 
stations.  The  information reproduced  helot~,  which has  been  brought 
to the  Commission services's notice,  shows  that pricing practices for 
this  kind of supply  are fairly different.  This  brief survey  does  not 
take  account,  however,  of some  increased gas  use  in power  stations in 
certain  Member  States,  for  which  the  Commission  services  has  no 
detailed  information  as  regards  quantity or price. 
59.  In  the  Nctherlonds,  Gasunie  will  be  supplying  SEP  3(Samenwerkende 
Elekriciteitsproduktiebedrijven)  with  20  000  million m  of  extra  gas 
at a  special rate  between  1982  and  1987.  The  price will  be  aliened 
on  that  of imported  coal  in  anticipation of  the  programme  to convert 
three  oil-fired  power  stations  with  a  combined  capacity  of  1  653  MW 
to coal.  This  extra sale  will  compensate  Gasunie  for  reduced  sales 
elsewhere,  especially on  the  export market. 
60.  In Itnly,  contracts concluded  by  SNN~ and  ENEL  provide  for  the  supply 
of natural ens  as  a  temporary  replacement  for high-sulphur heavy  fuel 
oil in  a  number  of dual-fired  po11rer  plants.  Most  of these contracts 
are interruptible.  According  to press  reports,  the gas price will  be 
aligned to high-sulphur heavy  fuel  oil.  In  its Communication  to  the 
Commission  pursuant to Directive  75/404/EEC,  the Italian authorities 
argue  that  this  arrangement  was  made  inter  alia  because  Italy's 
natural  gas  transmission  and  distribution  grid  has  not  yet  been 
extended  far  enough  to  the  north to  absorb  the  increasing quantities 
of gas  heine brought in under  the contract with Algeria. 
61.  In  Ireland  the  Irish  Gas  Board  has  stepped  up  deliveries  under  its 
1979 contract with the Electricity Supply  Board  on  a  number  of occas-
ions,  as  the  Kinsale  field  has  been  reassessed,  and  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  investment  needed  to  develop  a  distribution  grid. 
After  1987  it  plans  to  cut  back  sales  to  power  stations  substan-
tially.  At  the  moment,  the  Board sells  gas  to  power stations  at a 
price  between  that of fuel oil and  that of imported  coal.  This  thus 
fits  in  with  the  programme  to  convert  oil-fired  power  stations  to 
coal  - a  scheme  which has  already  started at the  Moneypoint  plant. - 11  -
62.  In  Der~lt,  an  anreement  in principle has  been concluded  between  the 
national undertaking  DONG,  which  is responsible  f'or  the  transmission 
of  natural  gag,  and  certain  electricity  undertakings  whereby 
2  500  million m  will  be  supplied  to  four  power  stations  durinr;  the 
period  1984-1991.  Some  of the  gas will  replace  fuel  oil,  and  some 
coal.  By  this  means,  DONG,  which  is in the initial stages of devel-
oping the  country's natural  gas grid,  will  be  able  to  meet  its off-
take  commitments  vis-a-vis  the  North  Sea  production  concessionaire, 
despite a  fall in  demand  as  a  reoul  t  of  the  recession.  This  tran-
sitory arrangement,  designed for  the special conditions of developing 
the  supply  grid,  includes  prices clauses  which will  discourage  both 
DONG  and  the  power  stations  from  increasing  the  volume  under  con-
tract.  The  Danish  authorities  regard  this  arrangement  as  econom-
ically sounder  than  the alternatives,  namely  diversion to exports or 
leaving the natural  gas  in the ground. 
(c)  Gas  supplied to fertilizer manufacturers 
63.  The  pricing of  gas  to  the petrochcoicnl  oector and  more  specifically 
for the  manufacture  of  ammonia  is  being reviewed  by  the  Commission's 
services.  the  Commission  has  completed its analysis  in  respect of 
such  pricing in the Netherlands,  and  will be  reviewing current prac-
tices with national  authorities  in several Member  States. 
64.  The  Netherlands  case  concerned  a  two-tier  pricing system  for natural 
gas  used  in  fertilizer  production,  related  to  whether  or  not  the 
product  was  being  exported  outside  Europe.  Following  a  series  of 
complaints  by  other  Member  States  and  industrial  enterprises,  the 
Commission  informed  the  Dutch  Government  earlier this year  that it 
had  opened  a  procedure  under  Article  93 ( 2)  EEC  in  respect  of  this 
pricing system. 
65.  In  the  course  of  this  procedure,  the  Dutch  Government  informed  the 
Commission  that Gasunie  had  abolished  the  two-tier  price system  and 
had  introduced,  from  November  1983,  a  generally applicable tariff in 
respect  of  very  large  industrial  users  located  in  the  Netherlands. 
This  tariff 3 is  based  on  annual  gas  consumption  of  at  least 
600  million m  ,  an  offtake  load  factor of  at least  90%,  interrupt-
ibility  at  the  supplier's  sole  discretion  and  at  short  notice,  and 
acceptance of gas  of differing calorific values. 
66.  After  careful  examination  of  technical  and  cost  factors,  the 
Commission  concluded  that  this  new  tariff,  which  is  part  of  the 
general structures  of the  Dutch  gas  tariff system  and  is  not sector-
ally  discriminatory,  did  not  contain  elements  of  State  aid  and, 
furthermore,  was  in conformity  with  energy pricing principles.  the 
Commission  therefore  decided  to  close  the  procedure  under 
Article  93(2}. 
67.  In  November  1983,  the  Commission  wrote  to  the  other  Member  States 
asking for  information on  current pricing practices  for feedstock gas 
to  the fertilizer sector.  A summary  of the replies is set out below: - 12  -
- United  Kingdom 
H.M.  Government  have  replied that British Gas  Corporation negotiates 
individual  contracts  with  all  consumers  who  take  more  than  25  000 
therms  per  year.  For reasons  of commercial  confidentiality and  the 
fact  that  BGC  operates  as  an  independent  public  corporation,  H.M. 
Government  is not in  a  position to give  any  information  on  individual 
contracts. 
- Germany 
The  Federal  Government,  in their  reply,  state  that gas  supply  con-
tracts are matters of negotiation between private  companies  operating 
under private law.  They  do  not have  any  information  on  the subject. 
- Denmark 
The  Danish  Government  states  that it does  not  supply  natural  gas  to 
the fertilizer industry. 
- Greece  and  Luxembourg 
No  reply has  been received  from  either authorities. 
- Belgium 
Distrigaz grants  a  special tariff to  the fertilizer industry based on 
the so-called border price,  i.e.  the  price at which it purchases  gas 
from  abroad.  As,  however,  this  border  price  includes  imports  of 
non-Dutch  gas  which  are  priced at  a  higher  level  and  certain minimum 
transportation charges,  the Belgian fertilizer industry,  although it 
gets  its  gas  supplies  at  favourable  prices  compared  to  the  rest  of 
Belgian  industry,  pays  a  higher price  level  than  that prevailing  in 
the Netherlands.  A recent press article suggests that a  new  pricing 
arrangement for fertilizer feedstock  has  been  entered into. 
- France 
The  French  Government,  in its reply,  sent the  Commission  a  contract 
between  Caz  de  France  and  a  French  fertilizer  producer  ( la Societe 
Chimique  de  la  Grande  Paroisse).  This  contract  allows  for  minimum 
quantities  at a  basic price,  with  a  formula  involving  quantity dis-
counts  for larger  amounts.  In  a  recent press report,  it was  stated 
that  French  gas  tariffs  for  fertilizers  were  aligned  on  the  prices 
charged  in the Netherlands. 
- Ireland 
The  Irish  authorities,  in  their  reply,  indicate  that  there  is  no 
standard industrial price tnriff for gas  supplies.  Each  contract is 
negotiated individually.  There  are  no  quantity discounts.  They  also 
state that  there  is  a  contract  between  the  Irish  Gas  Board  for  the 
supply of  natural  gas  to  Nitrogsn  Eireann  Teoranta.  The  volume  in 
the contract covers  52  million m  per annum,  the supply is interrupt-
ible.  Deliveries  commenced  1  April  1979.  The  agreement  is to  con-
tinue  in  force  for  a  20-year  therm  from  31  December  1979.  There  is 
no  provision for  renegotiation of contract prices. - 13  -
The  Italian  authorities  have  advised  that  preferential  natural  gas 
prices  apply  to  all  fertilizer  manufacturers  indiscriminately,  but 
only  in  respect  of  products  intended  for  the  Italian  market.  Con-
sequently,  Italian export sales  of fertilizer  either inside  or  out-
side  the  Community  are  not  manufactured  under  special  conditions 
which  give  them  a  competitive  advantage.  As  the  selling  price  of 
fertilizer  on  the  Italian  market  is  set  subject  to  government  con-
trol,  the  authorities argue  that the  gas price  follows  increases  in 
the price of fertilizer and not vice versa. 
In  conclusion,  the  Italian  Government's  view  is  that  current  prac-
tices  are  not  contrary  to  either  competition  or  state  aid  rules 
(Articles  85,  92  EEC). 
68.  the  Commission  services is continuing to explore  these  cases with the 
appropriate authorities in the  Member  States. MOOCC  2 
STATISTICAL  ANNEX Stn::!lARY 
Real  encrr_,y  price trends  in  the  Community  in  the  pont 1978 period 
differ v:idcly  accordinr;  to  fuel  nnd  market.  In  ~cncral, oil price;:; 
hnve  increnr,cd  by  more  thnn  other fuels. 
P.-:::::;idu::-.1  f\w~.  o.U  :for  incLI~·:tr,:'  and  i'<::~.~''r::tic  hcntin~ oil have  incrcnsed 
by  about  80~~,  in  rcnl  ter.:::::  ::d.nce  1978.  Only  indu!Jtric.l  gn-:::  prices 
(which  nre  ofte1<  .in~.h::xecJ  to  the  fuel  oil equivalent)  have  matched  thif:: 
rn  t~ of r;rmr th.  InL'l~;t:::·h·l  co:-:1  t:~c:  c::!:c  pricer;  have  barely  incrcnced 
in rcnl  term~>  r:jnce  1978 \lhilst im?.m:;tricl  oh.ctricibJ has  only 
incrensed  by  n.bout  207;,  in real  tcrw:;.  In  u~wful energy  terms, 
indur:trinl  r~n!'l  p::-iccr:  seem  to  be  ex lremcly  cor:1peti ti  ve  with rc:;ic:uci 
:f'n~l  oil,  but  the differentials favour  cc:ll  over oil in  industry. 
In the 'rr<::.nr:port  Sector,  ~r.-r:  dice~)! oil han  increased by  more  than 
r.1otor  spirit prices  ~Thich have  been  more  or  lesn  constant  in real 
terms  for the last four years.  In useful  energy  terms,  gnn dicocl oil 
is cheaper thnn  r.:otor Bpirit in all Community  markets  in 1984  - the 
same  situation as  in  1978. 
In  the domestic  nector,  do~~ntic gao oil prices have  increased  by  far 
more  than  other fuels.  Measured  in ur:eful  energy,  gao  is still seen 
to have  a  competitive  edge  over gnnoil,  but  the margin  is narrowing. 
The  straight domestic clcctricity:gaooil relation still favours 
gasoil,  but  this  gap  is also closing. 
As  for price dicpcrnion  in  Community  energy markets,  price dispersion 
has  dccrenned for all fuels  except electricity.  Strong change is 
noted for all oil products  - particularly fuel  oil and  also for coal 
and  coke.  Gas  price dispersion has  only slightly decreased  in the 
post 1978 period. CO!llmNITY  EfffiRGY  PRICES  - STATISTICAL  Atnmx 
1.  This  Statistical Annex  is concerned  ~lith three aspects of energy 
pricing in the  Community.  Firstly,  the  trend of real  energy prices  in 
the post  1973  and  1979 oil shock periods,  broken  down  by  major  market 
and  by  fuel;  secondly,  an  analysis of energy  price dispersion  in the 
European  Community  by  fuel  and  by  sector;  thirdly,  relative real 
energy  prices per unit of useful  energy  for  competing fuels  in the 
major markets  have  been  compared. 
2.  The  analysis has  been  mainly carried out at Community  level.  This 
involves  a  series of choices  on  how  to obtain a  "Community  price"  for 
a  particular fuel  or market.  For  example,  choices  have  to be  made 
whether  to use  simple average  prices or weighted prices;  purchasing 
power  standards or ECU  as  a  "numeraire";  prices  inclusive  or 
exclusive of taxes;  choices of typical  and  representative  consumer 
categories,  etc.  The  following parameters describe  the  choices  made 
for the analysis: 
-Domestic  and  transport sector prices  include all taxes,  whereas 
industrial prices exclude VAT. 
- Prices were  evaluated  in real  terms  by  converting into constant 
1982 purchasing power standards  (i.e.  at 1982 prices  and 
exchange rates). 
For  Graph  1,  weighted  prices were  used  for  the  Community,  based 
on  the fixed  1982 structure of energy  consumption  in the 
European  Community. 
- Prices are January prices of each year. 
- Consumer categories and  fuels  chosen were  as  follows: 
INDUSTRY 
- Residual  Fuel  Oil 
(max  24000t/year) 
Natural  Gas 
(418600  GJ/year) 
- Electricity 
( 10 GWh/year) 
- Coal  & Coke 
(max  50000t/year) 
TRANSPORT 
Gas/Diesel  Oil 
(pump  price) 
- Motor spirit 
(pump  price) 
DOMESTIC 
- Domestic  Heating Oil 
(delivered price) 
- Gas(125,6 GJ/year) 
- Coal 
Domestic 
electricity 
(20000 kWh/year) 
(In the domestic  market,  the analysis  focuses  on  energy  used for 
heating). - 3  -
GRAPH  1  - ImAL mmRGY  PRICit  TIUmDS  Ill  THE  COlll.tUlUTY  (1973-1984) 
3.  Explanation 
For Grnph  1  prices were calculated as  follows:  a  price per Gigajoule 
(GJ)  (net calorific value)  is calculated for  each  fuel  for  each Member 
State in constant 1982  purchasing power  standards  (at 1982 prices and 
exchange rates).  These prices are then weighted  according to the 
fixed  1982  structure of energy  consumption  in the  Community  to form  a 
Community  "real" energy price for  each  fuel  in each market,  which  is 
tracked overtime. 
4.  Results 
The  graphs  show  that not only have  real oil priceo tended  to  increase 
by  more  than other fuels,  but they have  also risen more  in the 
industrial  and  domestic heating markets  than  in the transport sector. 
Overall this is not a  surprising result since,  for example,  in a 
period of two  years  (end  1978 to beginning 1981)  the average  fob 
import cost of crude oil  into the  Community  increased by  more  than 
150%  in nominal  terms  and this was  reflected into the product markets. 
Although  nominal  crude oil prices then held until  1983,  the deval-
uation of the  ECU  against the dollar guaranteed that the  Community's 
oil prices  have  remained high  in real  terms. 
Electricity pricca,  however,  have  increased since  the  1978  index year, 
but only  by  about  15%  in real  terms  in both  the domestic  and 
industrial sectors. 
Electricity prices  show  the lowest growth  in the domestic sector. 
Among  the most  important reasons  for this more  moderate  upward  trend 
are  the increasing share of the  Community's electricity generation 
covered  by  nuclear and  imported  coal which,  ceteris paribus,  tends  to 
flatten the costs of producing electricity. 
Conl  end colce  pricen  to  industry by  1983 have  not  increased since  1978 
and  were  data available for January  1984 would  probably  show  a  fall. 
This reflects the state of the  international coal  market where  severe 
competition has  tended  to depress prices.  The  trend of gan pricen 
depends  on  the  type  of market.  In the  industrial market,  natural gas 
prices  followed  residual  fUel  oil prices  (due  to gas  price  indexing 
formulae  linking gas  to RFO  equivalent).  In the  domestic  sector,  the 
Community's  weighted gas price has  increased by  40%  since 1978- but 
this is some  40%  less than domestic gasoil. 
Finally,  the transport sector shows  that gas/diesel oil has  increased 
by  more  than motor spirit.  Indeed,  the  Community's weighted  motor 
spirit price appears  to have  been constant over. the last four years. - 4  - . 
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5.  Explanation 
For  Graph  2  (Real  energy price dispersion  in the  European  Community), 
the normalized standard deviation for each fuel  is plotted over  time 
(1973-1984)  as  a  measure  of the  "dispersion" of prices  in the 
Community  energy  marlwts.  The  mechanics  are  simple:  the  Memher 
States'  prices for  a  particular fuel  represent a  sample.  The  standard 
deviation of this sample  divided  by  the  mean  of this sample yields the 
normalized  standard deviation  for  that fuel,  which  is plotted for  each 
year.  The  interpretation of this is that the  nearer  a  curve 
approaches  zero,  the less dispersion there is in the prices of that 
particular fuel  among  Community  Member  States.  Likewise,  the higher 
the curve  above  zero,  the  more  the price dispersion or "spread" of 
prices there are  in the  Community.  This  does  not  imply,  pe~·  se,  that 
movement  towards  higher price dispersion is necessarily undesirable. 
It could  represent the  impact of real  cost differences or policy 
measures  (taxation,  etc.). 
6.  Results 
Graph  2  contains  4  graphs,  one for each fuel. 
(i)  OIL 
Since  1978,  real oil energy  price dispersion  in the  European  Community 
has  decreased  for  each  of the  four  products  (i.e. prices are  less 
spread out).  A particularly strong decrease is noted  in the  fuel  oil 
market  (ex VAT).  For  domestic heating oil,  most  progress was  made  in 
1979,  and  the degree  of dispersion has  been  more  or less constant 
since.  The  two  transport fuels  have  shown  similar rates of dispersion 
since  1978,  although  in recent years gas/diesel oil price dispersion 
is increasing.  Broadly  speaking,  these oil trends  could  be  due 
firstly to  Member  States oil pricing regimes  becoming more  market 
related and  secondly that the share of excise  taxes  has  decreased  as 
oil prices have  increased. 
( ii)  llATURAL  GAS 
Progress has  been  slower  in the natural gas  sector since  1978  than  in 
oil  (above),  although price dispersion at the  1978 starting point was 
lower  than for oil.  Price dispersion has  decreased  by  a  similar 
amount  in both the  industry  and  domestic  sectors.  In  the  gas  markets, 
there  are  two  effects which  could be of  importance.  On  the  one  hand, 
no excise  taxation working against lower dispersion,  but on  the other 
moves  towards  more  homogeneous  import prices  and  EC  producer prices. 
( iii  )  EI..ECTRICITY 
In contrast to both oil and  natural gas,  real  electricity prices  in 
both the industrial and  domestic  sectors are more  spread out  in 1984 
than  in 1978.  The  rate of increase of price dispersion is higher in 
the industrial market  than  in the domestic  market.  In  the  domestic 
market,  dispersion has  been  more  or less constant for six years.  The - 6  -
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l main reason for this can be  found  in the different electricity 
generating structures in the Member  States - which vary  from  low cost 
nuclear and  imported coal stations to high cost oil firing -plant. 
( iv)  COAL  b.  COKE 
Most  progress is noted  in this sector - and particularly in  the 
industrial segment. 
GRAPH  3  - RELATIVE  REAL  ElffiRGY  PRICES  PKR  UNIT  OF  USEFUL  ENERGY 
7.  Explanation 
Graph  3  concerns  the measurement of relative energy prices  in usefUl 
energy  terms  for  competing fuels.  This  means that the price of a 
particular fuel  per GJ  etc. is converted to  form  a  price per unit of 
useful  energy.  The  yields of each  fuel  in each  market differ.  For 
example,  the useful  energy yield for fuel  oil is 70%,  for domestic 
electricity 95%,  etc.  The  analysis here is at selected Member  State 
level.  In  each market,  the relevant oil price per unit of usefUl 
energy  is set equal  to 100.  If the resulting curve  is greater than 
100,  this  means  that the competing fuel  is more  expensive  than  OIL  per 
unit of USEFUL  ENERGY.  If the curve  dips  below  100,  the  competing 
fuel  is cheaper than  OIL. 
8.  Results 
Graph  3  contains  a  series of graphs for  each market  sector  (indus-
trial,  transport,  domestic).  In each case,  an  appropriate oil product 
price acts  as  the  "numeraire"  (=  100)  allowing judgments  to  be  made  on 
interfuel competitivity with oil. 
( i  )  IliDUSTRY 
Apart  from  Italy,  coal  and  coke  prices_to  industry by  January  1983 
were  considerably  lower than  fuel oil per unit of useful  energy.  This 
was  not the case  in-1973 or in 1978  (except for France),  and  the  fuel 
oil threshold price was  crossed  "downwards"  by  coal/coke  around 
1979/1980.  In  the larger markets  coal/coke prices  to industry in 
January 1983 were  only  70-80% of the  fuel  oil equivalent.  However,  it 
is not only simple price differences of different fuels  that determine 
demand  for  each fuel.  For example,  the capital and handling costs of 
using different fuels  are not the  same  and  these  along with price 
influence both  the choice of fuel  use where dualfiring is possible  and 
the substitution of one  energy  form  by  another  the  longer  term. 
As  for the relation of gnn  priceD to RFO,  mixed  trends are  noted.  _In 
France,  the Netherlands  and  the United  Kingdom,  gas  has  considerably 
improved its relative price to fuel oil since 1978.  In Belgium,  much 
smaller improvement for gas is noted,  whilst the latest information 
available for  FR  Germany  and  Italy is 1982. 
It is also interesting to note  that the straight electricity/fUel oil 
ratio still considerably favours  fuel  oil in all  Cowmunity  markets  -
although  the advantage  to fuel  oil has  about halved since 1978. - 8  -
( ii)  'l'RMISPOll'l' 
In all  CorrniUni ty markets,  automobile  diesel oil  iE:  chenper  than  motor 
spirit when  measured  in useful  energy  term~;.  This was  the  case  in 
1978  a..'1d  :i. t  rmnairw  the  case  in  1984.  The  avcraee price advnntage for 
diesel  fuel  over  premium  r;asoline  in  1984  in the  Community  was  about 
the  same  as  in 1978. 
(iii) nm.msTIC 
Two  comparisons  are  made  in the domestic sector.  Firstly,  domestic 
gas  is  compared  to heating r;as  oil.  Apart  from  Belgium where  the  two 
prices nrc  at about "parity",  natural gas  is seen  to be  considerably 
cheeper thnn  r;asoil  for  domestic heating in the  Community's  major 
markets.  Thi.s  i.s  particularly true  in  the United Kingdom  and  the 
Netherlands  (the  Comnunity's  main  gas  producers).  However,  the very 
favourable  situation existing in  1980 in  both  the  former  countries  in 
favour of gas has  since slightly eroded. 
Secondly,  domestic electricity prices  (20000  KWh/year)  are  compared 
with heating gasoil.  Here  the conclusions are the opposite of gas. 
Namely,  the price of gasoil  (and  therefore gas  as well)  is cheaper in 
every  Community  market than electricity for heating - although this 
simple price advantage for gasoil has  steadily decreased since 1978. - 9  -
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